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The Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers
ALEXANDER VOLOKH*
Faith-based prisons, as currently constituted, mostly violate the Establishment
Clause. They generally aren't chosen by a process that is neutral as between
religious and non-religious providers; they generally result in religious
indoctrination; they might offer greater benefits to participants so as to qualify
as 'coercion"; and they might delegate governmental power to religious
organizations.
In this Article, I propose a novel method of allocating prisoners: a system of
"prison vouchers, " by which prisoners could choose which prison to go to,
including, where available, a private, religious prison. Under such a system,
faith-based prisons would be fully constitutional: if prisons are selected
neutrally, without regard to religion, and if inmates can choose any available
prison, the Establishment Clause problems disappear. Prisoners would have
the "genuine and independent private choice'" that would bring religious
prisons within the protection ofZelman v. Simmons-Harris.
Prison vouchers would offer prisons greater leeway in other ways as well,
entirely unrelated to religion. Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
prisons under a voucher system would have greater ability than prisons do
today to "offer" at least some "constitutionally noncompliant packages" that
would be attractive to inmates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1999 to 2008, Prison Fellowship Ministries operated a faith-based
prison program called the InnerChange Freedom Initiative at the Newton
Correctional Facility, a men's medium-security prison in Iowa. 1 InnerChange
described itself as "an intensive, voluntary, faith-based program of work and
study within a loving community that promotes transformation from the inside
out through the miraculous power of God's love. [InnerChange] is committed to
Christ and the Bible. We try to base everything we do on biblical truth."'2
The wing of the prison devoted to the InnerChange program was nicknamed
"the 'God Pod.' 3 The program included, on the one hand, prayer and classes
with names like "Experiencing God," and on the other hand, classes like
"Substance Abuse, Anger Management, Victim Impact, Criminal Thinking,
Financial Management,... and Marriage/Family/Parenting"; 4 but even the
secularly themed classes were religious. As the program itself acknowledged,
"Biblical principles are integrated into the entire course curriculum of
[InnerChange], rather than compartmentalized in specific classes. In other
words, the application of Biblical principles is not an agenda item-it is the
agenda."5
1 WNNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRIsON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE
CONsTrruTION 19 (2009).
2 Ars. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509
F.3d 406, 413-14 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original).
3 SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 21.
4 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 415-16.
51d. at 414 (alteration in original).
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The InnerChange program was challenged for violating the Establishment
Clause; the district court,6 and later the Eighth Circuit, 7 declared it
unconstitutional. The State and Prison Fellowship Ministries defended the
constitutionality of the InnerChange program by likening it to the school
voucher program upheld in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.8 At least beginning in
2005, when the state switched from direct cost reimbursement to per diem
payment,9 InnerChange's "access to contract funds... depend[ed] entirely on
inmates' decision to choose InnerChange as their rehabilitation service
provider: if inmates participate in InnerChange, [it] gets the money; if they
don't, it doesn't." 10 Thus, according to Prison Fellowship Ministries, money
was paid to InnerChange as a result of the inmate's "genuinely independent
private choice,"" as Zelman mandates.12
This Zelman argument was a loser. The Eighth Circuit held that genuine
choice was absent here:
The inmate could direct the aid only to InnerChange.... For the inmate to
have a genuine choice, funding must be "available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited" and the inmates must "have full opportunity to expend.., aid on
wholly secular" programs. 13
Though Prison Fellowship Ministries and InnerChange emphasized they
"received funds only if the inmate chose them," the proper viewpoint under
Zelman, according to the Eighth Circuit, "is the chooser's (there, the parents'),
not the provider's (there, the private schools'). Here, the inmate had no genuine
and independent private choice because he had only one option." 14
The district court's and Eighth Circuit's analysis seems correct, and poses a
problem for any faith-based prison programs that go beyond basic provision of
chaplains and visits by religious volunteers. 15 But let's indulge in a little
thought experiment and imagine two versions of the InnerChange program.
6 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432
F. Supp. 2d 862, 934 (S.D. Iowa 2006).7 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425-26.
8 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 24, 209.
9 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425.
l°Brief of Defendants-Appellants Prison Fellowship Ministries & InnerChange
Freedom Initiative at 49, Ams. United, 509 F.3d 406 (No. 06-2741).
' 'Id. at 48.
12See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652; see also State Appellants' Brief at 45-46, Ams. United,
509 F.3d 406 (No. 06-2741).
13 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425 (second omission in original) (quoting Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,488 (1986)).
14Id. at 426 (citation omitted).
15 For a discussion of different sorts of faith-based programs, see Marc 0. DeGirolami,
The New Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist Commitments, 59 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1-2,
13-19 (2006).
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Version A is the version that actually existed in Iowa, operating at a public
prison that received prisoners by mandatory assignment.
For Version B, let's be more imaginative than the Iowa parties and fully
internalize the lessons of Zelman. Imagine that a convicted criminal defendant,
instead of being sent to a particular prison based on the allocation decisions of a
Department of Corrections bureaucrat, was handed a voucher, good for one
incarceration, which he would be required to redeem at a participating prison.
As in school voucher programs, suppose the inmate could go to a public prison
if he chose; or, if he wanted to, he could choose any available private prison,
whether secular or religious, provided the prison was within his security level
(e.g., medium security). Rather than, as in the Iowa case, choosing a program
that happened to exist at his own prison, an inmate could choose among prisons,
based on religion, amenities, safety, geography, or anything else. And suppose
the "God Pod" described above operated in a religious prison under such a
voucher scheme. 16
In this Article, I argue that Version A has rightly been held unconstitutional.
Even when funding follows the prisoner (which has not always been the case in
such programs), faith-based prison programs generally suffer from the
Establishment Clause problems of endorsement, coercion, and delegation of
government power, and are not saved by the Zelman doctrine of "genuine and
independent private choice." 17
However, I also argue that Version B overcomes all these problems, and
comes within Zelman, by allowing prisons to participate on a neutral basis,
independent of religion, and allowing prisoners to choose among any available
prison, public or private.
Prison vouchers have never been seriously proposed. But vouchers in the
prison context are actually less radical than they may seem at first glance. A
wide variety of prison-related and similar services are currently distributed in
roughly this way. States contract with organizations to run halfway houses to
provide twenty-four hour residential care for supervised offenders (and
offenders are not required to accept placement with a religious provider). 18
States contract with child care agencies to provide residential programs for
abused, neglected, or delinquent children (again, with an opt-out for religious
providers). 19 States mandate that inmates, parolees, or probationers attend one
of a variety of privately run alcoholism or drug addiction programs. 20 And
Ontario, and England and Wales, have implemented vouchers for criminal
defense lawyers for the indigent.21
16 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 95-98, 105-07.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 99-104.20 See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice
for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 110 (1993).
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In all these cases, participating providers might be public or private,
religious or secular. The inmate's ability to choose from a variety of providers,
not all of which are religious, is what makes these programs voucher-like.
Prison vouchers have a more ambitious scope, but in their technical
operation, they aren't that different. In the simple form described above, they're
nothing more than a rule of voluntary assignment and, possibly, the opportunity
for voluntary transfer at-will or at regular intervals (say, every few years). 22
And prison vouchers would do more than make the current batch of faith-
based prison programs constitutional (under the U.S. Constitution-state
constitutions are another matter23). When faith-based prison programs operate
today, they necessarily try to be ecumenical to some extent.24 But suppose a
religious organization isn't satisfied with such a program, just as it might not be
satisfied with ecumenical prayers and other watered-down expressions of
22There actually might be some constitutional difference between a voluntary
assignment-and-transfer rule and an actual voucher scheme--whether the money really
passes through the hands of the inmate may affect whether the scheme is valid under
Zelman. See infra text accompanying notes 60-69. In my other work, I discuss more
complicated schemes where the concept of "voucher" is doing even more work. For
example, each voucher could represent a monetary amount that varies from prisoner to
prisoner depending on his medical or other needs (with needier prisoners getting a larger
voucher) or on his criminal record (with more heinous or repeat offenders getting a smaller
voucher); prisoners with larger vouchers would thus be able to "afford" a wider range of
prisons. See Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 21), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1856108. But the simple version is
all that is necessary for our purposes here.
23 1 don't discuss state constitutional issues in this Article. But it's worth noting that
voucher proposals may still violate certain state constitutional provisions; thus, since
Zelman, school voucher litigation has shifted to state courts. See Preston C. Green III &
Peter L. Moran, The State Constitutionality of Voucher Programs: Religion Is Not the Sole
Determinant, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 275, 277-78; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional
Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 957-72 (2003); Irina D. Manta, Missed
Opportunities: How the Courts Struck Down the Florida School Voucher Program, 51 ST.
LOuIS U. L.J. 185 (2006). Some of these constitutional provisions, for instance "Blaine
Amendments," are education-specific. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("[T]he state []or
any subdivision thereof shall [not] use. . . any public money, . . . directly or indirectly, in
aid.., of any school.., under the control or direction of any religious denomination ... ").
But others are potentially more general, and could apply to religious prisons. For instance,
the Arizona Constitution prevents appropriations of public money "to any religious worship,
exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment," ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 12, and prevents taxes or appropriations "in aid of any church, or private or sectarian
school, or any public service corporation," id. art. IX, § 10. And the Massachusetts
Constitution prevents public money from being used to aid "any infirmary, hospital,
institution, primary or secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not
publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or
public agents .... MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.24 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 157-61.
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religion in public schools.25 Under a voucher system, it could become far more
ambitious. A religious group could run its own prison and advertise inmate
rehabilitation through intensive, and intensely sectarian, exposure to religion.
Vouchers could be the best, or perhaps even the only, way to save faith-based
prisons.
Why should we care about saving faith-based prison programs through
vouchers? The theory behind such programs-that religion can be a
rehabilitative force-is familiar and plausible. Even the non-religious should be
open to the idea, at the very least because we all have an interest in the
rehabilitation of inmates. If faith-based prisons work, it would be a shame for
them to be unnecessarily unconstitutional.
If faith-based prisons work. Do they? I discuss the empirical evidence at
length elsewhere; my conclusion is that, unfortunately, so far there is little
empirical evidence in their favor.26 Religious rehabilitative theory may be
plausible, but that doesn't make it true. On the other hand, there is also little
evidence that the theory is false. The bottom line is that there is little evidence,
period; moreover, not every program evaluation is uniformly negative.
Ultimately, the idea of experimentation is more important than particular
research results. A better-designed program might yet work; or, perhaps, some
existing programs already work but have not been adequately tested with the
right research design. Provided one can do so consistently with the Constitution,
it seems desirable to allow prison systems to experiment with such programs so
that a program may emerge that can be shown to work.
But another potential benefit of prison vouchers has little to do with faith-
based prisons. Rather, the potential benefit is the voucher system itself. As I
argue in my other work, 27 prison vouchers have the potential to dramatically
improve certain aspects of prison conditions that have proven remarkably
resistant to judicial or political solution.
Prison vouchers also have strong potential negatives, so I am not advocating
their broad-scale adoption. The main point of this Article is more targeted:
vouchers, as I explain in Part II, can save faith-based prisons from violating the
Establishment Clause.
25 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the inevitability of Religious
Inequality, 1996 BYU L. REV. 569, 572 ("In my house, we do not offer prayers 'to whom it
may concern."'); Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and
Protecting the Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century
on the Danger of Establishments to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 551-52
(noting that the school prayer at issue in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), "would hardly
be recognized as 'prayer' in any meaningful way by people of faith who take religion
seriously" and "was exactly what we would expect from a state agency trying to create a
prayer that would offend no one, side with no one, and not run counter to anyone's faith").
26 See generally Alexander Volokh, Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?, 63 ALA. L. REV.
43 (2011) (discussing the empirical evidence on the subject).
2 7 See Volokh, supra note 22.
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In Part III, I go beyond the Establishment Clause and argue that a prison
voucher system would also liberate prisons (if not their inmates) in other, non-
religious ways.
Prisoners have dramatically reduced constitutional rights, but they still
retain some. In general, people-prisoners or not-may benefit from being able
to waive their constitutional rights in exchange for other benefits. In the prison
context, inmates may agree to waive some part of their due process rights-for
instance, in exchange for better health care. A prison's ability to offer such a
package is limited by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. I argue that, in a
prison system that is more competitive from the inmate's point of view, prisons
would have more leeway to offer packages that would otherwise be
unconstitutional.
II. VOUCHERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH-BASED PRISONS
In this Part, I explain why faith-based prisons, as currently constituted,
likely violate the Establishment Clause, and how the Establishment Clause
problems disappear with prison vouchers.
To be constitutional, faith-based prisons must comply with the following
requirements:
* If monetary aid is involved, the aid must not have the principal effect of
advancing religion. In particular, the program should be free of
indoctrination, which includes domination by overtly religious material.
This is so regardless of whether the reimbursement is per diem, per
capita, or lump sum. 28
* In addition, the government must not choose the faith-based
organization for its own sake, but rather by a process that is neutral with
respect to religion. 29
* There must be no endorsement of religion. Direct monetary payments to
religious groups are one way of endorsing religion, but even without
money, government approval of the religious materials used is also
endorsement, as can the mere fact that the only available program is
based on the principles of a particular religion, or on religious
principles generally.30
* There must be no coercion, which includes any subtle pressure to join
the program or legal benefits from joining the program, like a greater
likelihood of parole or reduced security restrictions, or perhaps even a
markedly higher quality of life.31
* There must be no delegation of government power specifically to a
religious group. At the very least, this means that religious groups that
28 See infra text accompanying notes 37-42.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 44-53.
30 See infra Part II.A.2.
31 See infra Part II.B.
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run faith-based wings can't be in charge of keeping order and
discipline, but the prohibition may even extend to non-coercive aspects
of running a religious program.32
A faith-based prison might be able to comply with all these conditions, but
it would be difficult. The biggest problems seem to be those associated with
endorsement-for instance, avoiding indoctrination and choosing providers on a
religion-neutral basis. To avoid indoctrination, the material would have to be so
watered down as to not be associated with any particular religion, or even not be
associated with religion at all. Or, if the program were to retain its religious
character, the prison would have to allow a broad range of groups, defined
without reference to religion, to operate. The former option will seem
unattractive to many who seriously believe that religion can have a
rehabilitative effect; the latter option seems unfeasibly expensive. In addition,
prisons would have to make sure there were no severe quality differences
between religious and non-religious programs. And-at a minimum-the
religious program staff couldn't participate in order and discipline-related
decisions, which might make it harder for religious groups to induce
participating inmates to engage productively with the material.
I then explain how these problems would largely disappear in a world of
vouchers. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris establishes that, when money is funneled
to religious providers by the genuine, independent choice of beneficiaries, there
is no government advancement or endorsement of religion.33 When inmates
choose freely among a wide range of providers selected without reference to
religion, coercion becomes moot, and so does delegation.
A. Religious Effects
The main problem of faith-based programs that look like IrmerChange is
that they have "the effect of advancing.., religion." 34
Often this happens through the method of reimbursement: direct
reimbursement to a religious organization is unconstitutional if the aid "result[s]
in governmental indoctrination" or "define[s] its recipients by reference to
religion,"35 and the analysis is the same whether the payment is lump sum or
per diem. Even if we pretend that per diem payments are like private choice
programs, the aid is still invalid unless the religious organization is chosen as
the result of a religion-neutral process.
But a faith-based program can impermissibly advance religion even without
any money payments, just by endorsing the religious message.
As long as service providers are chosen non-neutrally, these problems seem
difficult to overcome. However, under a prison voucher system, these problems
3 2 See infra Part II.C.
3 3 See 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
3 4 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 5 Id. at 234.
[Vol. 72:5
CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
essentially disappear, for the same reason that "genuine ... private choice"
saved the school program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.36 The following
section elaborates on this point, with a concluding discussion of whether it
changes anything that prisons-unlike the private schools at issue in Zelman-
are state actors.
1. Monetary Aid
a. Direct Reimbursement
The Eighth Circuit invalidated the 2000 to 2004 portion of the contract
between Iowa and InnerChange for exactly the reasons stated above. The direct
reimbursement arrangement in effect during those years37 unconstitutionally
advanced religion because it "result[ed] in governmental indoctrination" 38 (a
not-too-difficult conclusion in light of the "Bible study, Christian classes,
religious revivals, and church services" that "dominated" the program39) and the
aid "define[d] its recipients by reference to religion"40 (since inmates, to
qualify, had to be "'willing to productively participate in a program that is
Christian-based'". 41)
What would it take for a faith-based prison program to be constitutional, if
we take the direct-reimbursement business model as given? 42
First, one would have to remove domination by Christian material and stop
insisting on inmates' productive participation in such material. 43 In the eyes of
some, this would mean watering down the material so much as to make the
religious material unrecognizable. Would this even be attractive to religious
groups anymore?
In addition, the aid would have to be "offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion."'44 Providing a single secular alternative
36 536 U.S. at 652.
37 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509
F.3d 406, 423 (8th Cir. 2007).38 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
39 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 424.
40 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
41Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425.
42The direct grant model may make sense for many social services, which must
maintain capacity regardless of fluctuations in the number of participants. See Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 74
(2005).
43 See id. at 86-89.
44 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion). It has been argued
that the faith-based initiatives program during the Bush Administration, despite its facial
neutrality, "target[ed] Christian groups and reward[ed] those organizations politically
friendly to the administration's policies." See Megan A. Kemp, Comment, Blessed Are the
Born Again: An Analysis of Christian Fundamentalists, the Faith-Based Initiative and the
Establishment Clause, 43 HOus. L. REv. 1523, 1555 (2007); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra
20111
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
side-by-side with the single religious alternative 45 seems inadequate for the
"broad range." 46 And there is clearly not enough space in any given prison for
every single religious and secular organization to run its own program in its
own wing. But could a more limited number of programs, representing the
major faith traditions, plus a comparable secular alternative, be constitutional? 47
Even such a program, if it did provide the necessary "broad range," 48 would
fail the "offered ... without regard to ... religion" criterion.49 As long as
certain religions are chosen for their own sake (for instance, because they
represent the "major faith traditions" at the prison), it still seems that the
program would be vulnerable to an Establishment Clause challenge, at least by
lone dissenters from minority religions. In fact, even if every sect could be
accommodated, the program would still seem dubious given Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education,50 in which the Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutional for public schools to host teachers of various religions
(Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, with a secular alternative) to offer thirty-
minute religious classes to willing students. 51 In such a program, Justice Black
wrote that the State was "afford[ing] sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it
[was helping] to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the
State's compulsory public school machinery." 52
note 42, at 42-43, 61-62 (discussing Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Montana Office
of Rural Health, No. CV 03-30-BU-RWA (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2004)). The faith-based
program has continued under the Obama Administration with only modest changes. See,
e.g., Peter Steinfels, Despite a Decade of Controversy, the 'Faith-Based Initiative' Endures,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at Al1; Obama and the 'Faith-Based' Initiative, AMS. UNITED
FOR SEPARATION CHURCH & STATE (Jan. 2011), http://www.au.org/media/church-and-
state/archives/ 201 1/01/obama-and-the-faith-based.html.
45 As suggested by Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Good News of InnerChange, 7 AVE
MARIA L. REv. 25, 54 (2008).
46 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion).
47 See Lynn S. Branham, "Go and Sin No More": The Constitutionality of
Governmentally Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 339
(2004).48 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion). Accommodation of only major
religions may be insufficient. See, e.g., Americans United Files Litigation Challenging
Veterans Administration Bias Against Wiccans, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION CHURCH &
STATE (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.au.org/media/press-releases/archives/2006/l /files-
litigation.html.
49 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion).
50333 U.S. 203 (1948).
51Id. at 207-10.52 Id. at 212; see also Katerina Semyonova, In the Big House with the Good Book: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 209, 230-
31 (2005). McCollum is apparently still good law. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 116 n.6 (2001) (distinguishing McCollum).
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So the prison would not only have to have a broad range of programs, 53 but
the criteria for choosing the programs would also have to be unrelated to
religion.
The preceding discussion assumed that a prison could afford a range of
programs. But even a small number of programs could be prohibitively
resource-intensive, especially if, like Iowa's "God Pod," they are residential.
Iowa officials sought out the InnerChange program precisely because the state
could not afford anything else. 54 One could imagine a scheme where a prison
offered every religious and secular organization a chance to run its own
rehabilitative operation and then invited as many programs into the prison as it
could accommodate. Perhaps the "broad range" 55 requirement can be applied
with the necessary sensitivity to the space restrictions in prisons; perhaps it
would be acceptable even if there were only one program, which was religious,
provided the religious provider legitimately won a neutral bidding process. 56
(However, this wouldn't overcome the "coercion" aspect of the doctrine, which
I discuss below.57) In any event, realistically, this might still result in just a few
programs at any given prison, 58 with the number and scope dependent on the
resources available to it. 59
53 See Maya Anderson, The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Programs: A Real
World Analysis Based in New Mexico, 37 N.M. L. REv. 487, 530 (2007).54 See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 21-22.55 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion).56 See Branham, supra note 47, at 340, 348-49.
57 See infra Part II.B.
58 George W. Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STGs) in
American Prisons Today: Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey,
NAT'L GANG CRIME REs. CTR. (2005), http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/corr2006.html ("The
average American prison provides time and space to just over six different religious groups."
The average among surveyed facilities was 6.3, with a high of 22 groups meeting at one
surveyed prison.).
59 Some commentators raise the issue of entanglement. Suppose InnerChange had tried
to solve its "indoctrination attributable to the state" problem, see Mitchell, 530 U.S at 809
(plurality opinion), by keeping its accounts so as to avoid the diversion of public funds to
religious uses. (Five Justices in Mitchell believe that divertibility is problematic even when
neutrality is present; see id. at 840-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
890-95 (Souter, J., dissenting)). Could the resulting "state surveillance," "inspection," and
"evaluation," see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971), fix the attributable
indoctrination problem but in the process cause an entanglement problem? See id; Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 42, at 89-93; Kemp, supra note 44, at 1554-55. Perhaps not. "[P]ervasive
monitoring," Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 861 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), isn't
required to avoid diversion. One can have "constitutionally sufficient" safeguards against
diversion, based on self-auditing and occasional monitoring visits, see id at 861-62, without
creating excessive entanglement. See, e.g., Conley v. Jackson Twp. Trs., 376 F. Supp. 2d
776, 786-87 (N.D. Ohio 2005). (There is such a thing as undermonitoring, see, e.g., ACLU
v. Foster, No. Civ.A. 02-1440, 2002 WL 1733651, at *5, *7 (E.D. La. July 24, 2002); Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 42, at 100-02, but it's a problem that now seems not too hard to
overcome).
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So, most basically, faith-based programs are probably unconstitutional
under a regime of direct-cost reimbursement unless the religious content is
toned down significantly. This alone may make directly reimbursed faith-based
programs unattractive to religious groups. In addition, the prison has to offer a
broad range of groups, chosen neutrally with respect to religion, the opportunity
to operate faith-based groups would only be allowed if they pass a religion-
neutral selection process. The selection of a faith-based group might require the
selection of other groups as well, which may be very costly.
b. Per Diem Reimbursement
i. How to Treat Per Diem Reimbursement
One might wonder why we should care about the constitutionality of direct
reimbursement. Even if some social services require large up-front payments, 60
private prisons today generally work based on per diem reimbursement, 61 and
this is how the Iowa InnerChange program worked in its later years.62 And
surely per diem or per capita reimbursement systems should be considered
equivalent to voucher systems. As Judge Posner said in the context of state
funding of attendance at a religious halfway house, in such cases:
[T]he state has dispensed with the intermediate step by which the recipient of
the publicly funded private service hands his voucher to the service provider.
But so far as the policy of the establishment clause is concerned, there is no
difference between giving the voucher recipient a piece of paper that directs
the public agency to pay the service provider and the agency's asking the
recipient to indicate his preference and paying the provider whose service he
prefers. 6 3
Prisons are naturally different from schools in some relevant respects: they'll certainly
require much more monitoring than schools, since they keep prisoners twenty-four hours a
day and exercise pervasive control over them-control that, in a great many cases, severely
implicates the prisoners' constitutional rights. Of course, the Establishment Clause concern
isn't pervasive monitoring as such, but pervasive monitoring that leads to entanglement with
religion. (Pervasive monitoring of prison health care, for instance, needn't connect with
religion at all.) Monitoring can intersect with religion, for instance, to the extent the prison is
suspected of rewarding or punishing prisoners based on religious factors. So it's possible,
but not certain, that entanglement may be a greater problem for prisons.
60 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42.
6 1 See, e.g., RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
104 (1997).62 See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries,
509 F.3d 406, 425 (8th Cir. 2007).
63Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.
2003).
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And in the Iowa case itself, the Eighth Circuit panel-on which Justice
O'Connor, by then retired, was sitting by designation64-analyzed the per-diem
phase of the InnerChange program under Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.65
While this approach makes sense-indeed, the opposite approach seems
unduly formalistic-it seems incorrect as a matter of doctrine. In her separate
opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,66 which is controlling, 67 Justice O'Connor argued
that per capita-aid programs should not be treated like "true private-choice
programs" 68 of the sort that would arise in Zelman. In her view, in a true
voucher program, voucher recipients would retain more control over how their
vouchers were used, there would be less perception of government endorsement
of religion, and the government would not be in the position of making money
payments directly to religious organizations. 69
Thus, even if a faith-based prison program operates on a per diem basis, it
arguably still fits within the direct aid category, and the analysis would proceed
as in the previous subsection. 70
ii. Per Diem Reimbursement as Private Choice
But let us suppose that Judge Posner and the Eighth Circuit panel in the
Iowa case were right to treat per diem reimbursement under Zelman. Would this
save a faith-based program? Probably not.
To survive a Zelman analysis, the Eighth Circuit panel held, "indirect aid
programs must be 'neutral with respect to religion,' and provide 'assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious' organizations 'wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice.' 71
And, as we saw in the Introduction, 72 such genuine choice was absent
because "[t]he inmate could direct the aid only to InnerChange." 73 It didn't
64 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 413 n.1.
65 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425-26.
66 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
67 The plurality opinion was joined by four Justices, id. at 801, and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Breyer, was the only other opinion
supporting the judgment. Id. at 836.68 Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 1d. at 842-44; see also Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat'l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d
351, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 69-72.70 See supra Part II.A. L.a.
71 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509
F.3d 406, 425 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652
(2002)).72 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
73 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 425; see also Tim Eicher, Scaling the Wall: Faith-Based
Prison Programs and the Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 221, 231-32
(2007).
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matter that the program was voluntary. 74 Coercion raises its own set of
Establishment Clause problems, 75 but Zelman is about a different issue: whether
a program "has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing ... religion," 76 or whether
the "advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a
religious message, is reasonably attributable to ... the government. '77
What would it take to find genuine choice in this context?
Obviously, the program would have to be chosen neutrally, just as in the
preceding subsection.
The resource problem seems to apply here as well. In the direct
reimbursement case, the focus was on the neutral criteria for choosing the
organizations that received aid. But if we are right to consider per diem
reimbursement as analogous to vouchers, the recipient of the aid is now the
inmate himself. As the Eighth Circuit panel put it, the proper viewpoint "is the
chooser's (there [i.e., in Zelman], the parents'), not the provider's (there, the
private schools'). Here, the inmate had no genuine and independent private
choice because he had only one option."'78
The Zelman analysis requires us to consider all alternatives available to
inmates. 79 In Zelman itself, "remain[ing] in public school as before" 80 was one
of the alternatives that contributed to a finding of genuine choice, even though
the Court particularly stressed the non-"usual" alternatives, like community
schools and magnet schools.81 It's plausible that in the prison context, merely
remaining in the general prison population shouldn't count as an alternative to
the faith-based program-if we think of the faith-based program as not just a
place to be while in prison but as a therapeutic program. But as Prison
Fellowship Ministries and InnerChange pointed out, the Iowa Department of
Corrections provided "more than one hundred other treatment programs" and
ran "six therapeutic communities," including "an intensive post-release"
program.82 Still, the district court discounted the other options because "no
other program offer[ed] the full range of recommended treatment modules," 83
and the Eighth Circuit panel ignored the other options entirely. 84 Perhaps the
74 See Branham, supra note 47, at 331-36.
75 See infra Part II.B.76 Zelman, 536 U.S at 649.
77 1d. at 652.
78 Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 426 (citing Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655-56).79 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655; id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).80 1d. at 655 (majority opinion).
8 1 See id. at 659; id. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Brief of Defendants-Appellants Prison Fellowship Ministries & InnerChange
Freedom Initiative, supra note 10, at 48.83 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432
F. Supp. 2d 862, 930 (S.D. Iowa 2006); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 24-25
(discussing superior treatment options in God Pod).84 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509
F.3d 406, 425-26 (8th Cir. 2007).
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district court inappropriately "ratchet[ed] up the similarity requirements"8 5 to
find that there was no true choice; or maybe it was merely following Justice
O'Connor's view that, "to qualify as [a] genuine option[]," a therapeutic
program needs only to be an "adequate substitute[]. ' '86
So let us suppose that, instead, Iowa's Newton Correctional Facility had
offered a single, reasonably comparable secular alternative. Would there have
been sufficient choice to satisfy Zelman? Perhaps, though this is not totally
clear.87 But even if two choices are enough, having to provide those two could
be a significant drain on resources.
If we were to find true private choice here, we would be able to dispense
with some of the limitations present in the direct reimbursement case. For
instance, indoctrination wouldn't be attributable to the state, so we wouldn't
need to insist on watering down religious content. 88 But even so, the resources
problem may prove to be substantial.
c. Taking "True Private Choice" Seriously
To recap: Direct reimbursement of faith-based prison programs is likely
unconstitutional, at least unless the religious content is significantly watered
85 Brief of Defendants-Appellants Prison Fellowship Ministries & InnerChange
Freedom Initiative, supra note 10, at 48.86 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8 7 Zelman suggested that the set of schools that could accept vouchers not only was
selected neutrally but also was substantial-or at least, there was no limitation on the set.
The Cleveland voucher program permitted "the participation of all schools within the
district." Id. at 653 (majority opinion). Cleveland children enjoyed "a range of educational
choices." Id. at 655; see also id. at 673 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If the Cleveland program
had allowed no more than one or two private schools to operate, perhaps the analysis would
have come out differently, and perhaps this same limitation would doom a two-option choice
in prisons, unless courts would be willing to be more forgiving of prisons' space and
resource limitations.
88 Similarly, it seems that we wouldn't have to worry about diversion of funds to
religious uses, or potential entanglement issues that may arise from auditing schemes
designed to police diversion. See supra note 59; cf Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688-89, 691-93
(Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing divertibility concerns). Recall, supra note 59, that,
because of monitoring requirements, entanglement might be a greater concern for prisons
than for schools, even after Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); but, since divertibility is
no longer problematic in a true voucher program, then even a very heavy monitoring regime
need not worry about diversion of public funds to religious uses.
This isn't the end of the story: entanglement can arise not only from policing diversion,
but also from making sure prisoners weren't being illegitimately rewarded or punished based
on religious factors. Would religious punishment be expected and permissible in a religious
prison? Perhaps not, since the punishment function would be an "exclusive public function"
and therefore, to the extent it punishes, rather than just presents religious material, the prison
would continue to be a state actor. See infra text accompanying notes 176-85. So, to this
extent, it remains an open question whether one can design a monitoring scheme sufficient
to detect impermissible religiously based punishment but not excessively entangling.
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down; even then, there is a duty to choose programs on religion-neutral
grounds. Current doctrine requires that per-diem reimbursement be treated like
direct reimbursement, not like a true private choice program. But even if,
hypothetically, we treat per diem reimbursement like true private choice (in
which case, again, programs must be chosen on religion-neutral grounds), true
private choice will be lacking unless there is at least one comparable secular
program.
What would change under a true voucher program? First, any problems
associated with direct reimbursement would disappear, and there would be no
need to water down religious content. Second, a true voucher program would
fall within the Zelman analysis because the benefits would go directly to the
inmates, not to the prisons or program providers. Third, a voucher program
would guarantee that providers would be chosen neutrally because the voucher
would be available to any prison that satisfied certain minimum penological
requirements, such as security and the like.
And, most importantly, a voucher program would solve the resource
problem. No prison would have to offer more than a single program. The choice
would be guaranteed by inmates' ability to select one prison over another.
Constitutionally, there would be no need to give inmates the ability to choose
among different programs within a single prison. And a voucher program could
be structured to be largely cost-neutral, for instance if the voucher is equal to
the average cost of a single inmate's incarceration. An inmate who chooses one
prison over another, or who transfers between prisons, alters the allocation of
government funds, but he doesn't force the government to spend more. In fact,
to the extent private provision costs less than public provision, either because of
cost savings in the private sector89 or because religious prisons are subsidized
from the outside, 90 a voucher program can provide vouchers that are worth less
than the average cost of public incarceration, so that transfers to private prisons
(including religious ones) actually save the government money.91
89 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1838,
1875-77 (2002) (my student note); Geoffrey F. Segal & Adrian T. Moore, Weighing the
Watchmen: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Outsourcing Correctional Services,
REASON PUB. POL'Y INST., 2-3 (Jan. 2002), http://reason.org/files/
50b944ablf7dlcb15d8943c0c334df56.pdf (Policy Study No. 290). But see DOUGLAS
MCDONALD ET AL., ABT Assocs. INC., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 33-46 & app. 1 (July 16, 1998) (private prisons may not
save money, and current empirical studies are inadequate to test the proposition); Brad
Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost Effectiveness and Quality of
Confinement Indicators, UTAH CRIM. JUST. CTR., 2 (Apr. 26, 2007),
http://ucjc.law.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/86.pdf ("Cost savings from privatizing prisons
are not guaranteed and appear minimal.").
90 See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 23-24; Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 406,417 (8th Cir. 2007).
91 School voucher programs typically provide vouchers that are worth less than the
average cost of public education. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654; Caroline M. Hoxby,
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I have said that prison vouchers would indisputably be analyzed under a
Zelman framework. But whether they would pass depends on whether the
necessary freedom of choice can be guaranteed.
On the most obvious level, there must, at least, be a secular choice for any
inmate who wants one. In the terms of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Zelman, the secular option must be an "adequate substitute[]" for it to be a
"genuine option[]," even if it "need not be superior to [the religious option] in
every respect."'92 This requirement is connected to the "coercion" strand of the
Establishment Clause doctrine, and so I will discuss it below in connection with
coercion. 93
In addition, there must be not only the formal possibility of choice but also
no inappropriate pressure for inmates to accept the religious program. Given the
prison's total control over the inmate's existence and the potential obstacles to
prisoners' receiving good information, 94 this is a non-trivial requirement, but
one should be able to craft an acceptable program if one goes about it with due
respect for inmates' vulnerability.
Such problems have already arisen in the related contexts of probation and
juvenile delinquency.
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections contracted with Faith Works,
a faith-based organization, "to operate a halfway house providing
twenty-four hour supervised residential care and related services" for
"supervised offenders." 95 The department also contracted with other
providers, both secular and religious, though Faith Works was the only
organization that provided a long-term program. 96 On a motion for
summary judgment, the district court in Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum found that the program resulted in
religious indoctrination, so that it was invalid unless the state could
show that it wasn't responsible for the indoctrination.97 Whether the
state could show this was uncertain at the summary judgment stage.
The undisputed facts didn't conclusively establish whether the program
was freely chosen by the offender. A state official made the initial
recommendation of a program for the offender, and it was unclear how
much latitude the offender had to reject the recommendation. It was
School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States, 10 SWED. ECON.
POL'Y REv. 9, 13 (2003).92 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93 See infra Part Il.B. In addition, the requirement is connected to "endorsement," see
infra Part II.A.2, since if the government, as a practical matter, steers people toward religion,
it may be said to be endorsing religion.94 But see infra notes 217-18 (questioning the magnitude of the information problem).
95 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).96 1d. at 960-62.
9 7 1d at 966-70.
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also possible that an offender's court order could require a long-term
treatment program, for which Faith Works was the only provider.
98
* Michigan's Family Independence Agency contracted with ninety-six
private child care agencies, including thirty-five faith-based providers,
to provide residential programs for abused, neglected, or delinquent
children.99 A child was initially assigned to one provider by a
"computerized grid,"100 but could opt out of a religious provider if he
chose. 10 1 The district court in Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow held, and the
Sixth Circuit agreed, that, especially in light of "the youth and
vulnerability of the class of citizens at issue," 102 an opt-out was
insufficient to provide "true private choice."'1 3 Therefore, the state
couldn't fund placements with faith-based providers without violating
the Establishment Clause.104
These programs shouldn't be hard to fix.
Thus, in McCallum, the district judge ultimately determined what was
unclear at the summary judgment stage-that offenders entered the Faith Works
program as a result of their "genuinely independent, private choice." 105 Faith
Works was one of several programs under contract with the state; no one was
forced to participate; and though Department of Corrections agents could
initially recommend Faith Works, they were "instructed repeatedly to tell
offenders that Faith Works is a religious treatment program and that offenders
do not have to participate in the program." 10 6 Judge Posner agreed with the
district court. 107
The facts of McCallum aren't too different from those of O'Connor v.
California,10 8 where a district court ruled that, in light of the presence of a
secular alternative, it was not unconstitutional for a county to incorporate
Alcoholics Anonymous in the set of self-help programs that one could take as
part of DUI probation.'0 9
98 Id. at 971.
99 Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 479 F.3d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2007).
100 d.
101 Id. at 409.
102Id.
103Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835-36 (W.D. Mich. 2005); see
also Teen Ranch, 479 F.3d at 409.
104 Teen Ranch, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
105 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
106Id. at 910.
107Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.
2003).
108 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
109Id at 308.
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And in Teen Ranch,110 rather than give juveniles an initial assignment and
subsequent opt-out right, the state could simply allow the juveniles to choose
from a list of providers, which would include both secular and faith-based
options.
This should take care of the argument that nominally choice-based systems
may in fact pressure beneficiaries to choose the religious option. But one could
imagine a more radical version of the argument. Perhaps prisoners are unable to
freely choose because, being prisoners, they are under "duress"; 1 1 "the concept
of 'voluntary consent' is simply meaningless"" 2 under such "inherently
coercive conditions."' 13 Perhaps their capacity to choose is reduced, for
instance, if they are substance abusers. 114 Perhaps, on this view, the very idea of
incarceration is inconsistent with the idea of free choice.
Prisoners are placed in an environment that, by its nature, restricts their
freedom. They have no privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. 15 All sex,
including consensual sex, is forbidden in prisons, except in the limited context
of conjugal visitation programs. 116 Moreover, they are not allowed to exercise
choice in a range of activities; for instance, their right to consent to medical
studies is extremely limited. 117 Some prisoners, whose choices on the outside
have been self-destructive and who have been unable to control their impulses,
even experience prison as a refuge where they are freed from having to make
choices. 118
However, the mere fact that prisoners' choice is sometimes-or even
usually--restricted doesn't mean that prisoners are incapable of exercising
choice. Prisoners retain a whole range of constitutional rights, 119 even if these
can generally be significantly curtailed in the interests of prison management. 20
110 Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 479 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2007).
111 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 28.
l 2 GIORGIo AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 157-58
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
11 Bernard E. Harcourt, Making Willing Bodies: Manufacturing Consent Among
Prisoners and Soldiers, Creating Human Subjects, Patriots and Everyday Citizens 2 (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 544; Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 341, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1758829.
114See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 23, at 989.
115 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984).
1 16 See Christopher Hensley, Introduction: Life and Sex in Prison, in PRISON SEX:
PRACTICE AND POLICY 1, 10 (Christopher Hensley ed., 2002).
117 See INST. OF MED., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS
114 (Lawrence 0. Gostin et al. eds., 2007); Ian Urbina, Panel Suggests Using Inmates in
Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at Al.
ll 8 See MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE
UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 21-23, 30-31, 48-50 (1996).
"l9 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("[A] prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
120 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
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Many of these rights-for instance, free speech, free exercise of religion, and
marriage rights121-are premised on the idea that, despite their unfree condition,
prisoners are able to make autonomous moral choices. In fact, prisoners' ability
to experience religious freedom, 122 combined with outrage at prison officials'
arbitrary treatment of various meritorious religious claims, 123 motivated the
passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act;124 this act
was such that "in principle, inmate religious claims against states are given
more solicitous consideration than are nonprisoner religious claims against
states." 125 Prisoners are generally not required to work while in prison. 126 They
are allowed to control the course of their own litigation, and indeed, various
cases presume that prisoners are allowed to make "voluntary" choices in the
context of, say, participation in prison programs 127 or declining an offer of
protective custody.128
Moreover, even if a prisoner values prison and its coercive nature because
he doesn't like to make choices, this doesn't mean that a prisoner wouldn't want
to make some choices. Prisoners have always been thought able to use their
incarceration to experience religious and spiritual renewal; 129 and, even outside
of the religious context, a prisoner who values being free from everyday
concerns and the overwhelming choices of freedom 130 may value the ability to
choose a place with better medical care or lower assault or rape rates. Finally,
prisoners' (or anyone else's) religious (or free speech, or marriage) rights are
not generally thought to vary according to whether they are substance abusers.
There are various reasons for restricting prisoners' freedom. One may want
to exact retribution against evildoers, or incapacitate them, or deter others from
committing similar crimes. One may want to protect them from other
prisoners-and a prohibition on sexual contact may be justified by a surmise
that what looks like consensual sex may often be rape in disguise. One may
want to protect them from hard-to-detect coercion from other sources, as
perhaps in the case of participation in medical studies-one may be concerned
about the inevitable power imbalances between medical researchers and
121 See infra notes 348-59.
122 See Lynn S. Branham, "The Devil Is in the Details ": A Continued Dissection of the
Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 427-29 (2008).
123 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716-17 & n.5 (2005).
124 The "institutionalized persons" section of the Act is at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006).
125 Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, supra note 89, at 1895.
126 See Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of
Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 261,
272 (2006).
127 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 44-45 (2002).
128See Harding v. Jones, 768 F. Supp. 275, 277-78 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
129See, e.g., Duffy v. Cal. State Pers. Bd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 622, 629 (Ct. App. 1991);
DUNCAN, supra note 118, at 32-37; MALCOLM X WITH ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF MALCOLM X 155-90 (Ballantine Books 1992) (1964).
130 DUNCAN, supra note 118, at 26-27.
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inmates, especially in light of past abuses.13' But all this is consistent with a
recognition that, in whatever free space is left to them, prisoners are able to
make autonomous choices much like anyone else.
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle take a different tack, arguing that vouchers
outside of the education context "stand on less certain ground" than in
Zelman,1 32 but not because of problems with the notion of consent.
For some services, they argue, "the pool of providers tends to be dominated
by faith-based providers."' 33 "Substance abuse treatment programs" fall into
this category; likewise, they write, "rehabilitation of prisoners" is "likely to
attract a high percentage of providers that use explicitly religious methods to try
to transform those with whom they are engaged."' 134 In these cases, they write,
the "government may be under considerable pressure to bring secular providers
into the service market, although Zelman liberates the government from any
obligation to ensure that the secular options are as plentiful or as attractive as
the religious ones." 135
It isn't clear, however, that the prisoner rehabilitation field will inevitably
be as dominated by religious providers as Lupu and Tuttle claim. In the first
place, to take the example of education, the prevalence of religious schools in
voucher experiments doesn't necessarily indicate that religious schools will
dominate in actual voucher programs: it's the existence of widespread and
adequate funding through vouchers that would bring entrepreneurial secular
operators into the field. 136
Moreover, in the case of prisons, we don't have to speculate because we can
already observe substantial rehabilitative programs being run by the two largest
private prison companies: 137 the Corrections Corporation of America138 and the
GEO Group.' 39 These two corporations house about three-quarters of all
13 1 See Urbina, supra note 117. But see Harcourt, supra note 113, at 4-5 (discussing
possibilities for true prisoner choice to consent to medical studies in context of finding
malaria treatments for soldiers in World War II and Vietnam Wars); Christian Longo, Op-
Ed., Giving Life After Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at WK12 (death row inmate
desiring to donate organs).132 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 23, at 985.
133 Id.; see also Kemp, supra note 44, at 1557-58.
134 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 23, at 985-86.
135 Id. at 986; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 27-28.
136 See Caroline M. Hoxby, Preface: School Choice in the Wake of the Supreme Court
Decision on Vouchers, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, at xi-xii (Caroline M. Hoxby
ed., 2003) (arguing that because current voucher programs are limited in scope and of
uncertain permanence, they have not provided an economic incentive for the private sector
to create new schools).
137 See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1237 (2008).
13 8 See Inmate Rehabilitation, CORRS. CORP. OF AM., http://www.correctionscorp.com/
facility-operations/inmate-programs/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
139 See Evidence-Based Rehabilitative Programs, GEO GROUP, INC.,
http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/Programs.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
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prisoners in private facilities 140 -and prisoners in private facilities are about 8%
of the total number of prisoners nationally. 141 The GEO Group reports that
"[o]n any given day, more than 15,000 offenders are enrolled in programs at
GEO facilities... ,ranging from academic and vocational programs to
substance abuse treatment (both psycho-educational and Therapeutic
Communities). ' 142 In addition to academic education, vocational education, and
prison industries programs, GEO has behavior/life skills programs, substance
abuse programs, and residential drug abuse programs-as well as religious
programming, including chaplain services.143 Corrections Corporation of
America's portfolio is basically similar. 144
Thus, there don't seem to be any major obstacles standing in the way of
finding that a prison voucher system provides the requisite true private choice
for purposes of the Zelman doctrine.
2. Endorsement Without Money
The arguments against faith-based prisons canvassed in the previous section
focused on the permissibility of monetary aid to religious organizations. But
government can impermissibly advance religion by endorsing it even when no
money is changing hands. (This is the case, for instance, when a religious
display is on public property or when public officials are involved.145)
Endorsement sends a message that nonadherents of the endorsed belief "are
outsiders, not full members of the political community"; it also sends "an
accompanying message to adher[e]nts that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community." 146
This concern has been relevant for faith-based prison programs.147 In the
Chaplain's Education Unit ("CEU") at the jail in Tarrant County, Texas,
140 In 2005, Corrections Corporation of America had a 54% market share, see Michael
Brush, Company Focus: 3 Prison Stocks Poised to Break Out, MSN MONEY (Jan. 5, 2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20050105215726/http://moneycentral.msn.com/contentlP 105034
.asp (accessed by searching MSN Money in the Internet Archive Index). GEO has a 25%
U.S. private corrections market share, see Facts, GEO GROUP, INC.,
http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/facts.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
141 HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2009, at 34 app. tbl.20 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
142 Evidence-Based Rehabilitative Programs, supra note 139.
14 3 Id.
144 See Inmate Rehabilitation, supra note 138.
14 5 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-10 (2000); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Anderson, supra note 53, at 526-27.
146Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).14 7 See Kemp, supra note 44, at 1558-59.
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consenting inmates were taught "orthodox Christian biblical principles," 148 as
determined by the sheriff and jail chaplain. 149 No other religious view could be
taught in the CEU; inmates could meet with spiritual advisors of other religions,
but only "across a glass window via telephone."' 150 The Texas Supreme Court,
in Williams v. Lara,151 had little trouble concluding that the sheriffs and
chaplain's actions "could be perceived as reflecting county endorsement of the
specific religious content offered in the CEU."'152
Admittedly, this fact pattern is unusual: prison management usually doesn't
explicitly approve theological content. Government clearly can't "take a
position on questions of religious belief.' 153 But in determining whether the
government is endorsing religion, it isn't important that the religious message is
in fact delivered by a private organization, for instance Prison Fellowship
Ministries. "[T]he Establishment Clause prohibits.., the government's lending
its support to the communication of a religious organization's religious
message."1 54
Thus, in Griffin v. Coughlin,155 a requirement that an inmate participate in
an in-prison Alcoholics Anonymous program, which has religious content, has
been struck down for endorsing religion, 156 though the religious content came
entirely from the group running the program and not from the prison itself. In
Griffin, there was no secular alternative available, but it is plausible that-just
as when money payments are at issue-any process for choosing providers that
wasn't neutral with respect to religion would raise endorsement problems.
A voucher program would cure any endorsement problem. Zelman was
particularly concerned with government aid, but it also spoke more generally in
terms of endorsement:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice .... [t]he incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably
attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government. 157
Because reasonable observers are "deemed aware of the history and context
underlying a challenged program,"' 158 "no reasonable observer would think a
148 Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tex. 2001).
149 Id.
15°Id. at 177.
151 52 S.W.3d 171.
152Id. at 191.
153 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989).
154Id. at 601.
155 Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996)
156 See id. at 108.
157 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious [providers]
solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals,
carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement.' ' 59
3. But Aren 't All Prisons State Actors?
One may, at this point, think that one shouldn't too quickly import the
Zelman framework, which was developed for schools, into the prison context.
The most salient difference relates to state action. Private schools
participating in a voucher program generally aren't state actors. 160 It's therefore
uncontroversial that a private school can teach religion, and, since Zelman, it's
clear that such a religious school can be included in a voucher program. 161
But prisons aren't like schools. The Supreme Court has actually never held
that private prison firms are state actors in suits brought by inmates, though it
has assumed it.162 But appellate courts have held this, mostly based on the
"public function" theory,163 and they have certainly been right to do so. State
action is present when a private party exercises powers "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State,"'164 and while education doesn't fit within this
159 Id.
160 The state-action doctrine itself lays out the exceptional cases when a private school
may be considered a state actor. For instance, a private school may be a state actor to the
extent that the specific actions complained of are "compelled" or "influenced" by the
government, see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982), or if the school willfully
participates in "joint activity" with the government, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)), or if the
government "insinuate[s] itself into a position of interdependence" with the school, see
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), or if the government is
"entwined in [its] management or control," see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001). It's clear from the case law, see Rendell-Baker,
457 U.S. at 841-42, that such cases are the exception, not the norm.
161 536 U.S. 639.
162 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997); cf Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1254 (11 th Cir. 2008) (also assuming this).
163 See, e.g., Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir.
2003); Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2003); Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc.,
963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991); cf West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-57 (1988) (holding
private doctor contracted to provide medical care to prisoners at a public prison to be a state
actor).
164 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
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category, 165 surely imprisonment does. 166 Inmates in private prisons are entitled
to the same constitutional protections that they would have in public prisons. 167
Does this pose a problem for the constitutionality of religious prisons?
Surely, the state can't teach any religious doctrine as true. "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in... religion .... -168 How, then, can we
envision a religious prison, if even a private prison remains a state actor?
To answer this question, we need to be clear on what it means to be a "state
actor" and how it differs from actually being the "state." Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court hasn't always spoken clearly on the matter. Some cases talk as
though state actors are the state: "[t]he fundamental inquiry" in a state action
case "is whether the [defendant] is a governmental actor to whom the
prohibitions of the Constitution apply."'1 69 Others merely focus on the
challenged action, asking whether that action "must in law be deemed to be that
of the State."' 170 Others take an even milder tone, asking merely whether the
action "may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 171 Still others just ask
whether the challenged action is "fairly attributable to the State" 172 or
"chargeable to the State"'173 or whether the state is "responsible for the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complains."'174 The Supreme Court even cites
many of these formulations simultaneously, as though they were equivalent. 175
165 See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842; Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d
22, 26 (1st Cir. 2002).166 While the private sector has been involved in incarceration throughout American
history, see, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
437, 450-62 (2005), the requirement that one be locked up has always, in the United States,
come from the government.
167 For a discussion of the non-Establishment Clause implications of this, see infra Part
III.A. That public prisons are state actors is not only obvious but is also implied by Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
168 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
169 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 (1987); see
also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299 (1966).
170 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
171 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (emphasis added).
172 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1988).
173 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
174 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
175 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) (citing the "fairly treated" language of Jackson and using its own "fairly
attributable" language); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (using "fairly ... attribut[able]" and "State
is responsible" language and also citing "fairly treated" and "must in law be deemed"
language); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (using "fairly attributable" language, but folding into the
"fair attribution" question a requirement that "the party charged with the deprivation ... be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor," but at the same time making clear that a
"state actor" finding could be limited to specific actions, for instance if one conduct were
2011] 1007
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
All these statements are arguably consistent with each other. But the last
view-the one that focuses on the attributability of particular actions-is the
clearest statement of what state action means. Actual employees of the state are
state actors whenever they're on the job. 176 But if an apparently private party is
found to be a state actor, it doesn't become tantamount to the state in all cases
and for all purposes. The Eagle Coffee Shoppe, located in a public Wilmington
parking structure, may be a state actor insofar as it discriminates against black
patrons, 177 but surely it remains private enough to not have to provide due
process before firing its employees. 178 The New Perspectives School, which
educates problem students for the state of Massachusetts at the state's expense,
may not be a state actor insofar as it may fire its employees without due process
and in retaliation for their speech,179 but it is perhaps public enough that some
constitutional duties may apply to decisions involving students. 180 A creditor
may become a state actor if he uses certain prejudgment attachment statutes to
seize his debtor's assets,181 but surely if that creditor is a church, being a state
actor doesn't prevent it from conducting Sunday Mass. A religious nonprofit
"chargeable to the State"); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 847 (1982) (using
"attributable" language and also "regarded as governmental action").
176 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 n.18 ("[S]tate employment is generally sufficient to
render the defendant a state actor.... ."). But see David A. Strauss, State Action After the
Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 411 (1993) (arguing that "the automatic
treatment of all actions of the government as 'state action'--or at least as all equally state
action-should be qualified in favor of a more thoroughgoing functionalism").
177 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
178 Burton is actually written broadly enough to suggest the opposite:
Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is that when a State
leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case
here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the
lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the agreement
itself
Id. at 726. But the opinion itself heavily focuses, in a fairly fact-based way, on the state's
"participation and involvement in [racially] discriminatory action." Id. at 724. So, to the
extent that Burton suggests that the entire Fourteenth Amendment applies wholesale, this is
dictum and probably not good law today.
179 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830.
180 The majority's argument that the personnel decisions at issue weren't "compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation," id at 841, implies that the result could be different
in an area where the school was more heavily regulated. See also id. at 851 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[The majority] would apparently concede that actions directly affecting the
students could be treated as under color of state law, since the school is fulfilling the State's
obligations to those children under [state law]. It suggests, however, that the State has no
interest in personnel decisions."); cf Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 27
(1st Cir. 2002) ("Admittedly, .. . Rendell-Baker... involved claims to due process
protection made by teachers and not students; our own decisions ... held out the possibility
that students might have a better claim.").
18 1Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922.
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may be a state actor under the public function theory to the extent that it
operates a contract postal unit on church property, 182 but the entire nonprofit
(outside of the immediate postal area) doesn't serve a public function "any more
than selling shovels becomes a public function when a [contract postal unit] is
located in a hardware store."1 83
Once we properly conceptualize the state action inquiry as being not about
"who is the state" but about "when is one's conduct attributable to the state,"
things become clearer. Private prisons aren't state actors in the abstract. For
instance, various circuit courts have held, no doubt correctly, that private
prisons are still private when firing employees; 184 the Fourth Circuit has even
held, much more dubiously, that a private prison remains private when
providing medical care to inmates. 185 But when private prisons are fulfilling the
"exclusive public function" of incarceration, 186 their incarcerative functions,
like restricting prisoners' freedom and meting out punishment, are certainly
state action. Rewarding and punishing inmates based on religious factors will
thus continue to be unconstitutional. But to find out whether their offer of
religious services is likewise state action, we need to dig deeper.
Fortunately, we don't need to dig that much deeper. Consider the following
language from Zelman:187
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
182 Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 484, 492 (2d Cir. 2009).
183 Id. at 493.
184 See Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005); George v.
Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
185 See Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292-94 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The inadequate medical
care alleged in this case unquestionably arises out of defendants' operation of the prison, not
the fact of Holly's incarceration.").186 See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
187 The state action doctrine applies somewhat differently in the Establishment Clause
context than elsewhere. Some commentators characterize the two strands of doctrine as
inconsistent, see Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/Private Distinction,
123 HARV. L. REv. 1248, 1280 (2010), while others see the Establishment Clause strand as
"a specialized application" of the general doctrine, see Michael W. McConnell, State Action
and the Supreme Court's Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and
Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 681, 682 (2001). Carl Esbeck argues that the
Establishment Clause is properly regarded as a structural restraint on governmental power,
not a rights provision, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 2 (1998); under this view, it would
not be surprising if the state action doctrine applied differently than for traditional rights
provisions. (Note, though, that Esbeck, too, adopts a "fairly attributed" line, id. at 85, under
which the basic inquiry would be similar.) Regardless, the Establishment Clause cases do
take a somewhat distinct approach to the matter, so it is appropriate to look to Establishment
Clause cases to see when private action is attributable to the government for Establishment
Clause purposes.
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independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate
choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government,
whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. 
18 8
"Reasonably attributable" and "fairly attributable," I suggest, are the same.
If a voucher program passes the Zelman test as described above,189 the religious
content of any faith-based program isn't reasonably attributable to the
government. 190 This is true not because of a mechanical application of the
words of Zelman (which were, after all, written with schools, not prisons, in
mind), but because of the logic of true private choice: neutrality with respect to
religion, combined with individual control over who gets the voucher, makes
the recipient, not the government, responsible for the religious message as a
general matter, whether we're talking about schools or prisons.
So, even though any prison continues to be a state actor for certain
purposes, it remains a private actor for purposes of running a faith-based
program, for instance, the exposure to sectarian material. 191
B. Coercion
Faith-based prison programs have also been criticized for running afoul of
the "coercion" strand of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
188 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (emphasis added).189 See supra Part II.A. 1.
190 In a mandatory system, if, by regulation, an inmate can only get religious materials
through a chaplain, and if the chaplain position is delegated to a private religious
organization, then-on a rationale based on West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)-that
organization may become a state actor when it takes over the state's role of controlling
access to religious materials. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 603 F.3d 1118, 1123
(9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn, 611 F.3d 1097, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Phelps v. Dunn,
965 F.2d 93, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1992). In Pidyon, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that
the inmate could get religious materials elsewhere (or, at least, the inmate hadn't shown
otherwise), so the religious organization ended up not being a state actor. Florer v.
Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 639 F.3d 916, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2011).
191 Cooper isn't to the contrary, though it might appear so at first glance. In Cooper v.
Postal Service, the Second Circuit held that a nonprofit's religious display at a contract
postal unit in the immediate postal area violated the Establishment Clause. 577 F.3d 479,
493-96 (2d Cir. 2009). Why, then, wouldn't it be similarly invalid for a religious
organization to preach religion while incarcerating inmates? The answer is that in Cooper,
the court found that the display violated the first prong of the Lemon test-there was no
secular purpose. Id. at 495. By contrast, preaching religion while incarcerating inmates does
have the secular purpose of rehabilitation and is thus only vulnerable at prong two. It is at
prong two that the Zelman framework saves voucherized religious prisons by negating
government responsibility for the religious message.
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Coercion is implicated, for instance, if an offender-whether in prison,192
on parole, 193 or on probation' 94-is required to attend Alcoholics Anonymous
or Narcotics Anonymous meetings, which have a substantial religious
component, and isn't allowed to choose a secular program. 195 Conversely,
coercion is absent when a secular alternative to Alcoholics Anonymous is
available. 196 Coercion is also implicated when participation in a religious
therapeutic program is made a condition of earning good time credits. 197
One might think that most faith-based prison programs are immune from
the coercion problem, since participation in these programs is always voluntary.
But "coercion," in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, also includes "subtle
coercive pressure"'198 (like the desire not to be shunned by one's peers199), as
well as having to make a "difficult choice"200 and "forfeit... benefits as the
price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice." 20 1 In the
public school context, the question has arisen in the context of prayers at
graduations and football games, which raise questions of both peer pressure and
the opportunity to attend school events that are felt to be important. Of course, it
could be that the high school students that appear in the Supreme Court's cases
are different from prisoners; inmates, who are generally adults,20 2 are less
"impressionable" 20 3 than schoolchildren and "presumably are not readily
susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination." 20 4 On the other hand, the
192 Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 473-74, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996); Griffin v. Coughlin,
673 N.E.2d 98, 105-07 (N.Y. 1996).19 3 Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 709-10, 712-14 (9th Cir. 2007).
194 Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1069-70, 1074-77 (2d Cir.
1997).19 5 Inouye, 504 F.3d at 709-10, 712-14 (parole); Warner, 115 F.3d at 1069-70, 1074-
77 (probation); Kerr, 95 F.3d at 473-74, 479-80 (prison).
19 6 See O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994); In re Garcia, 24
P.3d 1091, 1096-97 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). Similar issues may arise outside of prison-for
instance, consider a parent who, as a condition of receiving benefits under the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families with Children program, is required to work, which will often
imply a duty to find child care. To what extent should the government be held responsible if
the parent is unable to find secular child care? See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of
Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers,
18 J.L. & POL. 539, 563-65 (2002).
19 7 See Nusbaum v. Terrangi, 210 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788-89 (E.D. Va. 2002); Ross v.
Keelings, 2 F. Supp. 2d 810, 818 (E.D. Va. 1998).
198 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
19 9 See id, at 592-93; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311
(2000).
200 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
201 Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.
202See, e.g., id. at 593; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298-99
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
203Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
204d; see also Branham, supra note 122, at 427-29; Eicher, supra note 73, at 229.
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coercion doctrine is about more than just peer pressure. Coercion is everywhere
in inmates' lives,205 so that while one can certainly call some activities
"voluntary," 20 6 perhaps one should still be alert for subtle coercive pressures.
Thus, in Moeller v. Bradford County, a vocational training program in a
Pennsylvania prison run by the Firm Foundation was challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds.207 The Firm Foundation, which received grants
from various federal, state, and local authorities, described its program as a
prison ministry, and the program-the only vocational training program
available to inmates in that facility-spent a great deal of time on "religious
discussions, religious lectures, and prayer," as well as "routinely proselytiz[ing]
to the inmates in the ... program." 20 8
On a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the plaintiffs challenging
the program had stated a valid Establishment Clause claim based on
coercion.209 The court stated that "the choice between foregoing educational
and vocational training in prison or enduring the Firm Foundation's efforts to
proselytize may be no choice at all."'210 In other words, the government's
"coercion" here was no more than the failure to offer educational and vocational
training outside of the program. If the coercion doctrine applies in prisons in
full force, 21' faith-based prison programs may be unconstitutionally coercive
even apart from the obvious problems of literal coercion and the "soft coercion"
of offering important programs that are unavailable to non-participating
inmates. At the most coercive end would be programs that offer "a better
possibility of parole"212 (at least if participation in the program as such is
factored into the parole decision) or reduced security restrictions. 213 At the least
coercive end would be programs that merely offer a higher "quality of life. 214
205 See Eicher, supra note 73, at 229.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
207 Moeller v. Bradford Cnty., 444 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Moeller v.
Bradford Cnty., No. 3:05CV334, 2006 WL 319288, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2006).
20 8 Moeller, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
20 91d. at 235. There were other possible Establishment Clause problems as well. Id at
332-35; Moeller, 2006 WL 319288, at *5-6 & n.6.
210 Moeller, 2006 WL 319288, at *6.
211 But see Lisa A. Biron, Note, Constitutionally Coerced Why Sentencing a Convicted
Offender to a Faith-Based Rehabilitation Program Does Not Violate the Establishment
Clause, 7 CoNN. PuB. INT. L.J. 107, 107 (2008) (suggesting a different coercion doctrine).
2 12 Richard R.W. Fields, Perks for Prisoners Who Pray: Using the Coercion Test to
Decide Establishment Clause Challenges to Faith-Based Prison Units, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 541, 561; see also Eicher, supra note 73, at 228-29; Semyonova, supra note 52, at 228-
29; cf Anderson, supra note 53, at 528-29 (discussing possible avenues of coercion in a
faith-based prison).
2 13 See, e.g., Douglas Roy, Note, Doin' Time in God's House: Why Faith-Based
Rehabilitation Programs Violate the Establishment Clause, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 795, 804-05
(2005).
214Fields, supra note 212, at 561. Some commentators have suggested that since
incarceration carries substantial stigma, the very existence of an effective rehabilitative
program, if it is religious, can be subtly coercive. See Anderson, supra note 53, at 528. Or,
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Programs that offer benefits like "a safer environment" might be somewhere in
between, since-as Justice O'Connor argues in her concurrence in McKune v.
Lile-15-at some point, a reduction in safety can be so significant that it can be
said to be coercive when the government obtains a waiver of a constitutional
right by "offering" the higher safety level.2 1
6
Under a voucher system, it is much less likely that there will be coercion.
The operation of the voucher system itself provides full choice, in a formal
sense. One may be concerned that prisoners won't have sufficient information
about available options, just as some are concerned that parents may not know
the actual quality of schools.217 But one can find out about prisons from several
sources: (1) by word of mouth, from friends or neighbors who have been in
prison, or from one's lawyer; (2) through advertising by prisons and prison
reviews by current or former inmates, perhaps on the Internet; and (3) through
reports of monitoring agencies or performance measures like the Logan quality
of confinement index.2 18 The government could require all sorts of information
disclosure.2 19 Moreover, prisoners should be highly motivated to find out about
prisons, since they're the ones who will be experiencing the prison they go to.
since religious inmates are "better people" (i.e., less violent) than other inmates, a program
that puts inmates with religious inmates is of inherently better quality (and thus subtly
coercive) from the participant's point of view. See Semyonova, supra note 52, at 228-29.
These forms of "coercion" seem too subtle even for the Supreme Court's coercion
jurisprudence; but it's hard to rule these arguments out since it's unclear where to draw the
line.
2 15 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 48-54 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
2 16 1d.; Fields, supra note 212, at 561. At some point, this sort of argument bleeds into
an "unconstitutional conditions" argument. See infra Part III.B.
2 17 KEvIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE:
POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 126 (1995) ("The market solution assumes parents and
students will have enough information to make a decision on what school offers the 'best'
education. This assumption appears to be patently insupportable."); Byron W. Brown, Why
Governments Run Schools, 11 ECON. EDUC. REv. 287, 292 (1992) ("Elementary and
secondary schooling are excellent examples of input-based relationships between agents
(schools) and their clients (students, parents and taxpayers). Furthermore, the relationships
are based on an inherent uncertainty in the production process that places the task of
monitoring output somewhere between expensive and impossible."); Richard F. Elmore,
Choice as an Instrument of Public Policy: Evidence from Education and Health Care, in 1
CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN
EDUCATION 285, 298-303 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) ("In education and
medical care there are at least two a priori reasons for skepticism about informed choice.
One reason is that the practice of education and medicine, and the organization of that
practice, are relatively complex.... A second reason.., is that providers.., have relatively
strong incentives to limit clients' access to information." (citation omitted)).
2 18 See HARDING, supra note 61, at 113-15; Developments in the Law-The Law of
Prisons, supra note 89, at 1889-90.
2 19 For instance, one could require that prisons publish, as part of their advertising,
publication of the length of the wait list and the rate of transfer out of the prison. Cf
Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 21, at 102. One possible model for prison information
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But what if the religious prisons are better than the secular prisons? As
Judge Posner has written:
[Q]uality cannot be coercion. That would amount to saying that a city cannot
adopt a school voucher system if the parochial schools in the city are better
than the public or secular private schools ....
It is a misunderstanding of freedom.., to suppose that choice is not free
when the objects between which the chooser must choose are not equally
attractive to him. It would mean that a person was not exercising his free will
when in response to the question whether he preferred vanilla or chocolate ice
cream he said vanilla, because it was the only honest answer that he could have
given and therefore "he had no choice." 220
While a strict "quality is coercion" view would prevent the government
from deliberately skewing the playing field toward religious providers by
underfunding secular alternatives, it would also, perversely, penalize effective
programs for their success if they happen to be religious. 221
At some point, large enough quality differences could constitute coercion.
But this danger is much less under a voucher system, which, to be valid under
Zelman, already requires "true private choice." The requirements of true private
choice might not necessarily be identical to the coercion standard. But at the
very least, true private choice requires that, on a system-wide level, the secular
options be "adequate substitutes" for the religious options, even if they might
"not be superior ... in every respect. '222 If this exists, coercion is much less
likely; conversely, if the secular options aren't adequate substitutes, this may be
enough of a quality difference to constitute coercion.
The government would thus have a continuing duty, even under a voucher
system, not to let secular options become too unattractive. But this duty could
be fulfilled differently under a voucher system than it is today. Today, the
religious option must not be too much more attractive than the secular option at
the same prison. But within a prison voucher system, the inmate chooses the
prison as a whole, not just a particular program. A voucher program can provide
substantial geographic flexibility-many inmates may want to choose a prison
near their families and communities, but there may be a few such prisons in any
given case; and other inmates may choose prisons further away based on
weather conditions, amenities, or other factors. The government's duty of
secular quality maintenance should apply not at the prison level, but at the
system-wide level. There must be enough sufficiently good secular spaces for
disclosure would be the federal government's "Nursing Home Compare" site,
http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare, which conveniently pulls together nursing home
information already collected by the government.
220Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Branham, supra note 122, at 437-38.
221 See Branham, supra note 47, at 330-31.
222 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,670 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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any inmate who wants one, and the duty to provide the compliant spot would
belong to the government, not to the individual provider.223
The government should be able to fulfill this requirement either by running
adequate secular public prisons or, in a hypothetical world of complete private
provision, contracting with prisons to accommodate prisoners who want an
adequate secular alternative. For instance, a Christian prison may choose to
accept "constitutional" prisoners, who could be housed in a different wing, and
be exposed to different material, than its "voluntary" prisoners.
C. Delegation of Governmental Power
A religious organization's actual management of its own wing may be
unconstitutional because, in the words of Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,224 it
would "enmesh[ a] church[] in the exercise of substantial governmental
powers."225 In Larkin, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute
allowing churches to veto liquor license applications within a 500-foot
radius.226 Such a power, the Court held, is "ordinarily vested in agencies of
government. '227 And "vesting discretionary governmental powers in religious
bodies," the Court continued, would "substantially breach[]" the "'wall' of
separation" between church and state.228 The Court continued, "[t]he Framers
did not set up a system of government in which important, discretionary
governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious
institutions." 229
The Supreme Court later relied on Larkin in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet,230 striking down a New York statute
drawing a special school district to coincide with a village of Hasidic Jews.231
The Court held that the statute was "tantamount to an allocation of political
power on a religious criterion," 232 "delegat[ing] a power [that] 'ranks at the
very apex of the function of a State,' to an electorate defined by common
religious belief and practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious
223 Cf Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1483
(2003) (suggesting that the duty to provide constitutional accountability should rest with the
privatizing government rather than with the individual private operator).
224459 U.S. 116 (1982).
225 Id. at 126. This doctrine has been likened to a form of "entanglement" that fits into
the Lemon test. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).226 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117.
2271d. at 122.
228I. at 123; see also Farris v. Minit Mart Foods, Inc. No. 37, 684 S.W.2d 845, 847-48
(Ky. 1984) (similar to Larkin).
229 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
230512 U.S. 687 (1994).
231 Id. at 690-91.
232Id. at 690.
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favoritism."233 Justice Souter wrote (for a plurality) that the statute departs from
the constitutional command of neutrality toward religion "by delegating the
State's discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its
character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives
no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised
neutrally." 234 As in Larkin, "civic and religious authority" were "united."235
Then, writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Souter wrote that, as in Larkin,
there was no 'effective means of guaranteeing' that governmental power will
be and has been neutrally employed. '236 Because of the "anomalously case-
specific nature" of the state statute, the Court had no way to make sure that
government was not preferring one religion to another.237
Other courts have similarly applied the Larkin/Kiryas Joel rule against
delegation of governmental power to religious organizations. 238 For instance,
the Fourth Circuit struck down a Baltimore ordinance criminalizing the
fraudulent sale of non-kosher food as kosher,239 where "kosher" was defined as
compliant with "the orthodox Hebrew religious rules and requirements" 240 and
inspection and reporting duties were delegated to a Bureau of Kosher Meat and
Food Control consisting of three Orthodox rabbis and laymen recommended by
Orthodox organizations. 241 Similarly, a district court found that a town's lease
of public school space from a Catholic church, under a lease that "requires that
the Town not use the rented facilities in any manner which is inconsistent with
the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church [and] requires the Town to rely
upon and defer to the teaching authority of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Boston," was likely unconstitutional. 242 In addition-though this has apparently
never been litigated-it has been argued that certain divorce statutes, which
233Id. at 709-10 (citation omitted).
234 Id. at 696 (plurality opinion).
235Id. at 697.
236 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 703 (majority opinion).237 Id.
238 In United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of Directors, First Church
of Christ, Scientist, 829 F.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D.C. Circuit invalidated a
private law giving the estate of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science
Church, an extended copyright in one of the church's founding documents; the court likened
the Church's "veto power" over dissident sects' publication of the works to the "veto power,
over even a less ideologically significant benefit," id. at 1170, disapproved in Larkin.
However, this is probably wrong, as the power to enforce a copyright probably isn't a
governmental power.
239 Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1340 (4th Cir.
1995).240 Id. at 1338; see also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349-a(2), (2)(b) (McKinney 2004).
24 1Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1339; accord Ran-Dav's Cnty. Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d
1353, 1355 (N.J. 1992); see also Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the
Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 48 (1992).
242 Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch. Dep't, 722 F. Supp. 834, 834 (D. Mass. 1989).
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grant clergymen a limited veto power over a civil divorce, are unconstitutional
on Larkin grounds.243
It seems plausible that running a wing of a prison is a governmental
power--"[t]he supervision and rehabilitation of inmates ranks near the apex of
the power of government."'244 If zoning power, kosher enforcement, and
(possibly) divorce finalization are governmental powers, then surely running a
prison is, too.
Of course, prisons' power wouldn't be standardless-which was the Larkin
Court's complaint about churches exercising a zoning veto.245 Prisons would be
subject to comprehensive constitutional and statutory regulations, as well as
judicial review.246 But the Larkin Court's other objections still hold. There
would still be the symbolism of a "joint exercise of... authority by Church and
State." 247 And religious organizations would be "enmeshe[d]... in the
24 3 A New York statute provides that someone seeking a civil divorce must take "all
steps solely within his or her power to remove any barrier to the [other spouse's subsequent]
remarriage," including religious barriers. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2)(i); see also id. at
§ 253(3)(i), (6). In particular, the statute was designed to alleviate the plight of the woman
whose husband refuses to grant her a get, or Jewish bill of divorce. Berman, supra note 241,
at 67-68 & n.342. Without a get-which only the husband can give-a woman cannot
remarry within Orthodox or Conservative Judaism. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and
Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious
Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 824 (1998). The statute thus conditions civil divorce
on the husband's granting of a get to his wife where necessary. Compelling a man, as a
condition of divorce, to perform a religious act may be unconstitutional all by itself. See
Patti A. Scott, New York Divorce Law and the Religion Clauses: An Unconstitutional
Exorcism of the Jewish Get Laws, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1117, 1162-67 (1996);
Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces:
A Study in Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 204, 212-35 (1985);
cf Berman, supra note 241, at 68-70 (rebutting arguments that granting a get is not a
religious act). But see Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha,
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 385-93 (1992); Marc Feldman,
Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 153-56 (1990); Greenawalt, supra, at 828-29. However, the New York
statute goes even further, decreeing that a civil divorce can't go forward "if the clergyman or
minister who has solemnized the marriage" certifies that the party seeking a divorce has
failed to take all steps to remove barriers to remarriage. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 253(7) (McKinney 2010). This "clergyman veto" provision is probably unconstitutional-
again, on Larkin-style grounds-because it gives the rabbi authority to prevent a civil
divorce from proceeding. See Greenawalt, supra, at 834; Scott, supra, at 1179-80; Marshall,
supra, at 254-55. Butsee Breitowitz, supra, at 390-91; Feldman, supra, at 157-59.
244 Patrick B. Cates, Comment, Faith-Based Prisons and the Establishment Clause: The
Constitutionality of Employing Religion as an Engine of Correctional Policy, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 777, 821 (2005); cf supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the analogous issue
of whether incarceration is an "exclusive public function").245 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982).
246 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 348-60.
247 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125.
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processes of government" 248-again, here, in the sense of the state functions of
incarceration and discipline.249
The delegation problem thus seems implicated if the officials of the
religious organization have a role in keeping order in their wing, keeping track
of disciplinary infractions, and the like. A religious organization may thus want
to divest itself from keeping order and discipline, leaving these coercive
functions to state corrections officers (or at least secular corrections officers
unaffiliated with the religious group), and limit itself to conducting religious
activities. But even this may not be enough to escape the delegation problem.
In Griffin v. Coughlin,250 which we saw in the section on coercion,251 the
New York Court of Appeals held that when the state mandated that an inmate
attend an in-prison Alcoholics Anonymous program, it had "delegate[d] to [the
religious program] a crucial part of the State's discretionary authority to
conduct mandatory treatment programs for alcohol- and drug-addicted inmates
in the State's prison system." 252 It is true that in this case, the AA program was
mandatory, not optional.253 But the Court of Appeals could have rested its
analysis on coercion alone 254 and not bothered with delegation. And if merely
conducting a program is an exercise of the state's discretionary authority, it's
unclear why the state's discretionary authority doesn't also include the authority
to run optional programs.
So while a religious organization's divesting itself of disciplinary functions
may be enough to avoid delegation problems, the caselaw is unclear on the
subject.
But vouchers would make this problem moot--even if the religious
organization retains disciplinary functions. As with the other Establishment
Clause problems, neutrality is the key to avoiding forbidden delegations. The
problem in Larkin wasn't that a veto power over liquor licenses happened to be
held by a church. Rather, the problem was that churches as such (together with
schools) were allowed a veto power,255 to the exclusion of others. A statute that
allowed any landowner within a 500-foot radius to veto a liquor license would
presumably be immune from an Establishment Clause challenge, even if the
veto power were exercised by a church in a particular case. Or, even under the
current statute, probably a religious school would have been able to exercise the
veto power, based on the generic grant of veto power to schools.
248 1d. at 127.
24 9 See Eicher, supra note 73, at 233-34.
250 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996).
251 See supra text accompanying note 156.
252 Griffin, 673 N.E.2d. at 107.
253Md. at 99.
254 Coercion was, indeed, one of the bases for invalidation of the program. See id. at
105-06.
255 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
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None of this is discussed in Larkin explicitly, but it's the most plausible
reading of Larkin, especially in light of the later analysis in Kiryas Joel.256 In
his plurality opinion, Justice Souter comments on the "united civic and religious
authority" 257 presented by the case, writing that "[w]here 'fusion' is an issue,
the difference lies in the distinction between a government's purposeful
delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation on principles neutral to
religion, to individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt
of civic authority. '258 Justice Souter identified "[t]he origin of the district in a
special Act of the legislature, rather than the State's general laws governing
school district reorganization" as "anomalous. 2 59 (The initial organization of
the village of Kiryas Joel in 1977, as opposed to the later creation of the school
district, was precisely according to such a neutral law.260) Justice Souter
continued:
Because the district's creation ran uniquely counter to state practice, following
the lines of a religious community where the customary and neutral principles
would not have dictated the same result, we have good reasons to treat this
district as the reflection of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of
civil authority. 261
Justice Souter-in the portion of his opinion that was for the Court-further
noted:
The fact that this school district was created by a special and unusual Act
of the legislature... gives reason for concern whether the benefit received by
the Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other
religious (and nonreligious) groups....
The fundamental source of constitutional concern here is that the
legislature itself may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously
neutral way. 262
In short, it was the favoritism of this unusual act toward a specific religious
community that doomed it,263 not any general prohibition against delegating
governmental power to religious groups among others. 264
2 56 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
2 57 Id. at 697 (plurality opinion).
258Id. at 699.
259 1d. at 700-01.
260 Id. at 691 (majority opinion).
2 61 Id. at 702 (plurality opinion).
2 62 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 702-03 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor's opinion
similarly stresses that neutrality would have saved the scheme. Id. at 717 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). And Justice Kennedy, who didn't join
any part of Justice Souter's opinion, argued to the same effect in his concurrence. Id. at 722,
731 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
263 Id. at 706-08 & n. 10 (majority opinion).
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A statute that neutrally allowed different groups, religious or secular, to run
a program in a prison, or even a wing of a prison, or even an entire prison,
would thus not fall within the prohibition on religious delegations: "[W]e have
frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided
religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause
challenges." 265 Divesting oneself of disciplinary functions wouldn't even be
necessary.266
D. Any Other Way Forward for Faith-Based Prisons?
There are a few arguments that, despite the problems discussed above,
faith-based prison programs as currently constituted are nonetheless
constitutional. I think these arguments ultimately fail, but I'll mention them
anyway because they appear in the literature.
264 The previous cases would surely have come out differently had the delegation been
neutral with respect to religion. Kosher fraud enforcement schemes, see supra text
accompanying notes 239-41, are uncontroversial when they are mere trademark
enforcement. See Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Am. v. Royal Food Distribs.,
665 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Greenawalt, supra note 243, at 789-90; Irna D.
Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 381, 402 & n. 116 (2009). In the Christian
Science copyright case, even if it was correctly decided, surely the only problem was the fact
that the copyright extension was granted by a Private Law. See United Christian Scientists v.
Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., First Church of Christ, Scientist, 829 F.2d 1152, 1169 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The get statutes, see sources cited supra note 243 and accompanying text, are
probably unsalvageable, but that is because they involve several constitutional problems
simultaneously, including the compulsion of a religious act and the court's need to judge
religious doctrine in determining the validity of the get. Cf, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976) ("'[TI]he First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes."'
(quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969))). Whether the fact
pattern in Spacco v. Bridgewater School Department, 722 F.Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1989), can
be salvaged by neutrality is interesting and complicated, but too tangential to discuss here.
265 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 704.
266One case contradicts this view, but it's probably wrong: State v. Pendleton, 451
S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994), where the North Carolina Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
Baptist university's establishment of a police force. The neutrally worded statute allowed
"[a]ny educational institution... [to] apply to the Attorney General to commission such
persons as the institution ... may designate to act as policemen for it." Id. at 276 (second
omission in original). However, the court held that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to Campbell University, a religious university, because the state had delegated the
police power to a religious institution. Id. at 281.
Because of the neutral delegation-and as the dissent in that case remarked, id. at 284
(Whichard, J., dissenting)-it should have been held valid under Kiryas Joel (which had
come out just half a year earlier). The Indiana Court of Appeals recognized as much in
Myers v. State, 714 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1999), noting that a similar statute made "no distinction
between religious and secular institutions" and applied "to all educational institutions of
higher learning." Id. at 281.
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First, modem-day faith-based prison programs are more likely to be found
constitutional if courts defer to prison officials under Turner v. Safley.267 Courts
have taken different positions on this question,268 but the dominant view seems
to be that Turner doesn't apply to Establishment Clause claims. 269 This seems
to be the better view: the Turner test is aimed at evaluating the permissibility of
restrictions on inmates' freedom, while Establishment Clause challenges often
involve not restrictions on individual freedom but a broader right to be "free"
from governmental endorsement of or entanglement with religion.270 Indeed,
the second prong of Turner, which asks "whether... alternative means of
exercising the right.., remain open to prison inmates,"271 makes sense for Free
Exercise Clause challenges but not for Establishment Clause challenges. 272
Second, current faith-based prison programs are more likely to be
constitutional if they can be characterized as an "accommodation" 273 that
"alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise." 274 In prisons, where "the government exerts a degree of control
unparalleled in civil society and severely disabling to private religious
exercise," 275 such accommodations usually don't run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. It is thus uncontroversial that prisons may pay chaplains.276 But it's a
stretch to liken a residential, faith-based immersion program to a chaplaincy
program. The accommodation principle "contain[s] the seeds of [its] own
267482 U.S. 78 (1987); see Branham, supra note 122, at 420-24; Branham, supra note
47, at 303-06; Eicher, supra note 73, at 238.268 See Branham, supra note 47, at 304 n.79; Semyonova, supra note 52, at 222-26.
269 See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 188 (Tex. 2001) (agreeing with the
"overwhelming majority" of courts).
270 See Semyonova, supra note 52, at 224.
271 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
272 See Semyonova, supra note 52, at 225.
273 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).
2 74 1d. at 720; see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) ("[T]he government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and ... it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause." (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480
U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Branham, supra note 122, at
419 n.62, 430-31; Branham, supra note 47, at 340-42, 348-49; Eicher, supra note 73, at
236; Scott Roberts, The Constitutionality of Prison-Sponsored Religious Therapeutic
Communities, 15 REGENT U. L. REv. 69, 72-78 (2002).
275 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720-2 1.
2 76 See, e.g., Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Rudd v. Ray,
248 N.W.2d 125, 128-29 (Iowa 1976); cf Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 296-97 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (military chaplains and other examples);
Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448, 457 (8th Cir. 1988) (hospital chaplain);
Duffy v. State Pers. Bd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 622, 627-28 (Ct. App. 1991).
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limitation"; 277 it's hard to argue that Iowa's "God Pod," for instance, is doing
nothing more than alleviating government-created burdens.278
So faith-based prisons are unlikely to get much support from either the
Turner deference rule or the accommodation principle. For a program to be
constitutional under the current regime, it will have to avoid the pitfalls outlined
in the previous sections:
" Its religious content must be significantly watered down, so that one
cannot find "religious indoctrination" as in the Iowa case. 279
* It must be chosen by a process that is neutral as between religious and
non-religious programs. Thus, the process that chose it must have been
capable of selecting a secular program. 280
" There must be at least one, and possibly several, comparable secular
programs. 281
* The program must not only be formally voluntary but also not offer
significantly greater benefits-for instance, a greater possibility of
parole or a safer environment-than secular alternatives. 282
" Program officials must not play any role in maintaining order or meting
out discipline, though even divesting oneself of these governmental
roles may not be good enough.283
Some are skeptical that it's possible to fulfill all these conditions. 284
Perhaps the most inclusive faith-based programs might be constitutional-one
example may be the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Life Connections program,
which "hires spiritual guides of different faiths, links inmates with mentors of
their own faith, and provides no special privileges to participants." 285 The
program is also open to non-believers: "those of no designated faith engage in
277 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 110.
278 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).279 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 44-53, 255-64.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45; see also Picarello, supra note 45, at 53-
54; Semyonova, supra note 52, at 219-20, 232.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 211-16; see also Branham, supra note 47, at
347-48; Picarello, supra note 45, at 55-56.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 250-54.
284 See, e.g., Cates, supra note 244, at 779, 824.
285M. at 824-25. Cates also points to the program at Lawtey Correctional Institution in
Florida as "a closer case .... Full-time chaplains recruit volunteers to lead programs
covering religious material, anger management, and addiction counseling, in which only half
the inmates participate .... The program is theoretically faith and character-based, rather
than based on a view of a specific religion .... " Id. at 825. However, the emphasis on
"faith," even if not "a specific religion," is likely insufficient to save the constitutionality of
this program. Moreover, as noted above, the reduced security precautions offered at Lawtey
may result in Lee v. Weisman-style coercion. On Lawtey, see also Eicher, supra note 73, at
239; Semyonova, supra note 52, at 226-32.
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individual study during chapel times."286 Thomas O'Connor and Jeff Duncan
explain:
The Life Connections Program... is basically a reentry preparation program
that brings people of all different faiths together to work on a common
curriculum that was designed by a group of chaplains in consultation with the
Change Company. As part of the program, the members of the different faith
groups work on the common curriculum. Program participants then take that
work back to volunteers from their own faith tradition, where they work the
material again in the context of discovering what the resources of their own
faith tradition have to say about the content of the curriculum. For example,
part of the common curriculum concerns "spirituality" in general, and part of it
concerns "building community," but each faith tradition might work with and
understand these topics in a faith-specific way. Because the program is truly a
multi-faith program that supports many different faith traditions, it avoids
many of the constitutional difficulties of the religious prison units that are
single-faith programs.287
But to the extent that the Life Connections Program is constitutional, it's
because it's basically a secular program (which poses no Establishment Clause
problem) combined with extensive, optional extracurricular use of chaplains
and volunteers (which likewise poses no Establishment Clause problem).
One shouldn't be surprised if advocates of programs like InnerChange are
disappointed that they can't run something more all-encompassing. In light of
the need to avoid indoctrination, any permissible program may be too watered
down for the tastes of some religious groups. Accommodating secular inmates
may be cheap enough within the volunteer-based Life Connections Program,
but within a more all-encompassing program, running one or more comparable
secular programs may be too expensive for the prison system itself. And giving
up order and disciplinary functions may compromise a program's ability to
make sure that the inmates are engaging productively with the material. "Order
and discipline," after all, may be something as simple as "You can't stay here
anymore because you aren't participating."
But whether or not one could design a constitutional faith-based program
under the current regime, it should be clear that faith-based prison programs are
on much more solid ground in a world of prison vouchers.
Indeed, if the foregoing analysis is correct, faith-based prison programs are
entirely constitutional under a voucher system, provided any organization (that
can satisfy technical requirements, for instance related to security) can
286Federal Bureau of Prisons Life Connections Pilot Program, OHIO DEP'T OF
REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/iej-files/200702_McFarland
_FederalLifeConnectioins.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (note the misspelling of
"Connections" in the filename).
287 Thomas P. O'Connor & Jeff B. Duncan, Religion and Prison Programming: The
Role, Impact, and Future Direction of Faith in Correctional Systems, OFFENDER PROGRAMS
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 81, 87.
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participate, and provided there is a comparable secular spot for any inmate who
wants one. This last requirement is much easier to satisfy under a voucher
system because the comparable secular spot doesn't need to be at the same
prison as the religious program. Rather, the government's duty to provide such
a spot is system-wide: it could provide the spot at a public prison, at a private
secular prison, or even by contract at a religious prison (which would have to
provide a religion-free environment for the objecting inmate, perhaps in a
different wing of the prison). So even if there isn't enough space at a prison, or
if a particular prison doesn't have enough resources to run more than one
program, there's no constitutional problem as long as the objecting inmate can
easily transfer to a "compliant" prison.
The mention in the last paragraph of a "religious prison" bears clarification.
Under the current system of mandatory assignment, all we can talk about is
religious programs that operate within a single prison. For the entire prison to be
religious would, at the very least, violate the coercion strand of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. (By analogy, think of education: even the most ambitious
current proposals to integrate religion into public schools typically go no further
than introducing non-denominational prayer and teaching creationism.) But
under a voucher system, if the duty to maintain a secular alternative is system-
wide, not prison-specific, there should be no bar to a religious organization's
building and operating its own prison. If the voucher statute allows it, Prison
Fellowship Ministries could run not only an InnerChange program in a prison,
but also an entire InnerChange prison that incorporates religion to a degree
unthinkable under the current regime. 288 (Just as, if a school voucher system
allows vouchers to be redeemed at religious schools, the Catholic Church is free
to run voucher-accepting schools that feature prominent crucifixes, teach
religion from an exclusively Catholic perspective, and expose children to vocal
group prayer. 289) The prison's punitive function would still be an "exclusive
public function" and therefore state action, so (unlike a school) it couldn't
reward and punish based on religion,290 but intensive programming based on a
single religion's material would be permissible.
288 It's possible that the voucher statute must allow it, and that refusal to allow it would
violate the Free Exercise Clause. The debate over whether religious schools must be
included in school voucher schemes-that is, over the reach of Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004)-is thus directly applicable to the prison voucher context. On Locke, compare Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 42, at 28-30, 46-47, and Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court Issues a
Monumental Decision: Equal State Scholarship Access for Theology Students Is Not
Required by the Free Exercise Clause, FmtDLAW (Feb. 27, 2004),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040227.html, with Thomas C. Berg & Douglas
Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State Payments for Services
Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REv. 227, 246-52 (2004), and Douglas
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding
the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REv. 155, 184-86 (2004).
2 89 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 27.
290 See supra text accompanying notes 176-83.
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In sum, prison vouchers would substantially cure the Establishment Clause
problems that currently plague faith-based prisons, thus providing a way
forward for advocates of faith-based prisons that doesn't involve watering down
religious content or giving up on discipline.
E. Is This Exercise Worthwhile?
Should we be glad about this? On balance, I believe we should, even though
there is no strong evidence that faith-based prisons work.
Elsewhere, 291 I analyze the available empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of prison religious programs in reducing either in-prison
infractions or some measure of post-release recidivism. I conclude that very few
studies have any statistical validity.
The only credible studies to date are those that compare (voluntary)
participants in faith-based programs with people who volunteered for the
program but were rejected. Among those studies, several find no statistical
effect of the religious program.
Finally, even studies that find a statistically significant effect seem to
compare participation in the program with the alternative of no program at all,
rather than participation in a comparably funded secular program. Thus, even if
a religious program is better than nothing at all, it could be because of the
access to treatment resources (for instance, mentors and counselors) and not
because of the religious content of the program.
So there seems to be little empirical reason to believe that faith-based
prisons work. On the other hand, there is also no proof that they don't work.
Perhaps future research will answer this question. More important than whether
any particular program works is whether we allow the experimentation that
would allow us to discover programs that work in the future. Even if most
programs don't work, we can consider that the effort is a success if we find one
program that does work and are able to replicate it more widely. It is therefore
sensible to experiment with such programs, provided someone wants to run
them, provided someone wants to enroll in them, and provided the programs
operate constitutionally-for instance, through a prison voucher system, as I
have explained here.
Let's move past these empirical questions, and on to another one. Might
faith-based prisons be affirmatively harmful beyond the narrow question of
recidivism? Some commentators have expressed concern that prisons are
"fertile grounds for radical Muslim chaplains to recruit" adherents and foster
terrorism; 292 and allowing faith-based prisons may well concentrate adherents
291 Volokh, supra note 26.
292 DeGirolami, supra note 15, at 34 (quoting MARcI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2005)); see also John W. Popeo, Combating
Radical Islam in Prisons Within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise Clause, 32 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 135 (2006).
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of particular religions, including Islam, in particular prisons. Should we adopt a
system that could lead to a Muslim prison?
I take no position here on whether the concern over radicalization is well-
founded. In 2004, the DOJ's Office of the Inspector General raised concerns
about in-prison radicalization and noted that domestic terrorists Richard Reid
and Jose Padilla had been converted and radicalized in prison,293 but otherwise
gave little information on the magnitude of the problem. Paul Rogers, president
of the American Correctional Chaplains Association, told a Senate committee in
2003 that terrorist recruitment in prisons and jails was a "potentially serious
concern," but that reports of actual terrorist infiltration had been "blown way
out of proportion." 294
But to the extent the concern has some basis, prison vouchers might
actually alleviate the problem. Some of the concern does stem from the
activities of Muslim clerics,295 but many blame primarily an inmate-driven
"breed of 'Prison Islam' that distorts [traditional] Koranic teaching to promote
violence and gang loyalty. ' 296 The heavy involvement of radical inmates in
Muslim observance in prison, in turn, stems from an "acute [Muslim] clerical
shortage"; as of 2006, there was one chaplain for every 900 inmates.297
Moreover, those who are concerned about Muslim religious activity cite not
only the radicalization of existing Muslims but also the conversion of non-
Muslims. 298 Allowing Muslim prisoners to self-segregate may alleviate the
clerical shortage (if there are economies of scale in chaplaincy), and may also
reduce the amount of recruitment among non-Muslims.
As I've mentioned, this is ultimately an empirical question. I bring this up
as a possible argument, but overall, I remain agnostic on the issue.
But the case for (or against) prison vouchers is broader than the mere
promise (or threat) that it would allow experimentation with faith-based prisons,
and even broader than any religion-based aspect. Even if we had no reason to
293 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS' SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6 (2004)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0404/fmal.pdf.
294 Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as
an Operational Base: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Paul Rogers), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?
id=4fle0899533f7680e78d03281ff19bc6 (witness testimony may be accessed from this
page).295 See Popeo, supra note 292, at 140, 150.
296 DeGirolami, supra note 15, at 34-35; Primary Sources: "Prison Islam," ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 2004, at 48, 48 (citing OiG REPORT, supra note 293, at 8); cf Knox, supra
note 58 ("about half [of prisons surveyed] allow inmates to be the spiritual leader of other
inmates.., an average of 1.3 religious services are [led] by inmates inside the typical
American prison").297 Popeo, supra note 292, at 138 (quoting Primary Sources, supra note 296, at 48); see
also Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration, supra note 294.298 Popeo, supra note 292, at 137 (citing Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration, supra
note 294).
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expect anything from faith-based prisons, there may be some reason to think
that prison vouchers are a good idea in their own right.
There are serious problems at prisons, including-to name just a few-high
rates of violence (including rape) and low-quality health care. These problems
have proven resistant to democratic or legal reform--voters are often
unsympathetic to prisoners' concerns, individual prisoner lawsuits and
institutional reform litigation are difficult, and, even where private prisons exist,
whether a higher-quality facility enters the market depends on the competence
and incentives of state procurement officers.
Letting prisoners choose their own prisons could, for the first time, give
prisons a meaningful market incentive to improve. Unfortunately, prison
vouchers also have strong negatives, like facilitating the self-segregation of
prisoners according to gang affiliation, which might increase the power of the
gang in the outside world, as well as make life worse for inmates at a prison
dominated by a gang that is not their own.
In any event, the constitutionality of faith-based prisons is a side effect of
prison vouchers, which have their own advantages and disadvantages. I discuss
all of this at length elsewhere.299 However one comes out on the merits, the
availability of faith-based prisons probably intensifies the case for or against
vouchers because there will be a greater set of competing prisons with a greater
set of governing philosophies. If one thinks prison competition for inmates is
positive overall, more competitive pressure will probably be beneficial. On the
other hand, if such competition primarily caters to inmates' antisocial
preferences, more competition may exacerbate the problem.
III. BEYOND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
I have argued above that private prisons operating under a voucher system
would, like private schools, be largely freed from Establishment Clause
constraints.300 However, a voucher system may have other constitutional effects
entirely separate from the Establishment Clause issue of whether faith-based
prisons are permissible-in fact, entirely unrelated to religion.
Suppose, for instance, a prison wanted to save money, or improve security,
by instituting a (perhaps partial) ban on incoming mail. Or suppose-again to
save money or improve security-a prison wanted to get rid of its prison
grievance system.
Prisons can't do this unilaterally, because they're still state actors, and, even
under a voucher system, prisoners' constitutional rights are unchanged. But
what if prisons offered such a system to prisoners, perhaps in exchange for other
benefits that prisoners valued, like better health care or gym facilities?
State actors' ability to "offer" such "deals" is governed by the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As I explain below, prisons under a
2 9 9 Volokh, supra note 22.
300 See supra Part II.
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voucher system would be freer to offer such deals than under the current
system, because competition between prisons would mitigate the risk that
prisons would abuse their power over inmates.
Below, I first recall (in section A) that because prisons (public or private,
assigned or chosen) continue to be state actors, vouchers won't alter prisoners'
constitutional rights. Next, I describe (in section B) how the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine works and (in section C) how a voucher system is likely to
change its operation.
A. Prisoners Keep All Their Rights Under Vouchers
If we were talking about schools, a shift from a system of mandatory
assignment to schools (at least public ones30 1) to a voucher system (where some
or all of the choice schools are private) would have simple and profound
constitutional consequences. Because private schools are generally not state
actors, to the extent that a school voucher system leads to an exodus of students
from public to private schools, the students arriving in private schools will have
lost a considerable amount of constitutional protection. Depending on one's
point of view, one can find this desirable or undesirable. Private school students
have only whatever protection they can expect from market competition,
government regulation of private schools, and the conditions attached to the
vouchers.
However, this won't happen in the prison context. Private prisons remain
state actors, whether they are mandatory or "chosen" within a voucher
context.302 Thus, prisoners who leave for private prisons under a voucher
system won't lose any constitutional protection. Inmates at any prison, public or
private, mandatory or chosen, have the same rights.30 3 As I have explained, the
Establishment Clause consequences of vouchers would be substantial-fully
religious prisons would now be constitutional-but from the perspective of
prisoners' individual rights, the constitutional consequences of prison vouchers
would not be nearly so momentous.
30 1 See Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26 (lst Cir. 2002) (publicly
assigned private school not state actor when disciplining student); cf Caviness v. Horizon
Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (charter school not state actor when
firing teacher).
30 2 See supra Part II.A.3.
303 Indeed, inmates at private prisons may have even greater remedies than inmates at
public prisons, since correctional officers at private prisons, unlike their public counterparts,
do not get qualified immunity in § 1983 suits. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,
401 (1997).
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B. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine in Prisons
1. The Doctrine Generally
But even though state actors must respect constitutional rights, they still
have some flexibility when it comes to what deals they may offer to those with
whom they interact. The government's ability to limit your speech increases to
some extent when you take a job as a public schoolteacher 3°4-- or any
government job, for that matter.30 5 The federal government might not be able to
force states to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, 30 6 but it may offer
federal highway funds to states that do.307 The government can't force a
landowner to surrender property without compensation, 30 8 but, within certain
limits, it can offer a development permit to landowners who are willing to
surrender certain property.30 9
These examples all take the form of "deals" or "contracts," and involve
three steps. First, someone holds a constitutional right. Second, the government
controls a benefit which it is under no obligation to grant. Third, the
government offers the benefit in exchange for the waiver of the right.
(Unconstitutional conditions claims may sometimes look like retaliation claims,
when the offer of a discretionary benefit takes the form of a threat to withdraw
an existing discretionary benefit.3 10)
One could adopt a laissez-faire attitude and allow such deals generally, on
the theory that this contract, like most voluntary transactions, presumptively
benefits both parties.311 Or one could fear that, because of the great power of
government to induce behavior it likes by virtue of its control over massive
resources, the government generally shouldn't be able to achieve indirectly, by
conditions attached to benefits, what it couldn't achieve by direct regulation.3
12
304 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
305 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).
306 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30 7 See id at 205-12 (majority opinion).
30 8 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
309 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 856 (1987).
3 10 But not all retaliation claims are unconstitutional conditions claims in disguise. Most
retaliation isn't advertised ahead of time, so it can't be characterized as a deal, contract,
offer, or threat.
311 See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.).
312 Philip Hamburger's view is close to this end of the spectrum. See generally Philip
Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012). Others, such as Richard Epstein and Kathleen Sullivan, have argued for
somewhat weaker, though still strong, limits on the government's ability to offer conditional
benefits. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 (1989);
see also id. at 1419-21.
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In practice, the law has steered a middle course and tried to distinguish
valid conditions from invalid ones. The resulting body of law is the
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine," 313 though calling it a "doctrine" may be
somewhat charitable, since it's more like a number of apparently unrelated (and
perhaps incoherent 314) subdoctrines in different constitutional fields. Takings
analysis of exactions requires an "essential nexus"315  and "rough
proportionality. ' 316 Tenth Amendment analysis of spending conditions requires
"germaneness." 317 Fourth Amendment analysis of waivers of the right to be free
from unreasonable searches depends on the context, but at least in the
employment context, it requires nothing more than ordinary "reasonableness,"
where the fact of consent is taken into account as part of the reasonableness
calculus. 318 The First Amendment unconstitutional conditions doctrine is strict
in theory,319 complicated in fact. 320
2. The Doctrine in Prisons Today
How does this doctrine apply in the prison context? Suppose, for instance,
that a prison offered a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program for sex offenders, but
conditioned participation on willingness to complete and sign an "Admission of
Responsibility" form, listing all prior sexual activities, including uncharged
criminal offenses. 321 And suppose this form wasn't privileged, so that the
information could be used in later criminal prosecutions. 322
Prisoners retain their Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate themselves,
but what if they were willing to waive their right in order to participate in the
program? As a twist, suppose that waiver was necessary not only to obtain the
positive benefit of participation in the program but also to avoid loss of various
other benefits, like visitation rights, work opportunities, and residence in a safer
unit of the prison.323 In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court upheld the program;
the "minimal incentives to participate" in the program did not amount to
compelled self-incrimination. 324
313 See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001) (Fourth
Amendment); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (takings); Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990) (First Amendment); Doyle v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (in the foreign incorporation context).3 14 See Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1416.
3 15Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
3 16 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
317 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 208, 208-09 n.3 (1987).
3 18Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664, 671 n.2, 678-79
(1989); see also United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866-68 (9th Cir. 2006).
3 19 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996).
32 0 See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32 1 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30 (2002) (plurality opinion).322Id
'
323 Id. at 30-31.
324Id. at 29; id at 48-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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While Lile is a case where the benefits-for-rights deal was held valid, other
cases show that courts are willing to invalidate certain deals. For instance, a
Nevada Department of Prisons regulation required that, as a condition of prison
employment, inmates sign an agreement waiving the right to receive, among
other things, interest on their prison savings accounts. 325 The NDOP couldn't
confiscate an inmate's accrued interest outright.326 But could it constitutionally
induce an inmate to give up the interest as a condition of continued
employment? Or-presenting the question instead in "retaliation" form-could
it fire existing employees who refused to sign the new form?
Though I've presented these two questions as the same, the Ninth Circuit, in
Vance v. Barrett,327 answered them separately. Rather, it declined to answer the
first question; because the law on unconstitutional conditions in this context was
fairly undeveloped, the court was able to dispose of this question on qualified
immunity grounds.328 But, though the court noted an "utter lack of precedent
and standards" on the subject,329 the Nevada prison administrators didn't
dispute that such an unconstitutional conditions claim might be successful. 330
The second ("retaliation") question, on which there was more case law, came
out better for the inmates. Because the prison administrators didn't establish
that their retaliation had a "legitimate goal," the court held that it was
unconstitutional and not shielded by qualified immunity.331
The Ninth Circuit's division of the question into "unconstitutional
conditions" and "retaliation" components was probably unsound. 332 But the
resolution of the case does indicate generally that there are certain deals the
government may not strike, even if it can find a willing partner.
The following examples further illustrate that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine has some bite, even in prisons:
An inmate, because of child-molesting-related convictions, 333 had an
objectively reasonable fear for his safety in prison, 334 which implicated
an Eighth Amendment right to physical protection.335 He requested to
325 Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003).
326 1d. at 1090-91.
327 345 F.3d 1083.
3281d. at 1092.
329 Id.
3301d
"
331Id. at 1094.
332See supra note 310 and accompanying text; cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981
SuP. CT. REv. 309, 348 ("[A]ny doctrine that draws a distinction between a price for the
exercise of a right and a reward for the nonexercise of a right probably begs all the important
questions.").
333 Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
3341d. at 1294-95.
335Id. at 1303.
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be transferred to a maximum-security segregated unit.336 This unit had
severely limited amenities, including no chair, desk, or table; no access
to work, rehabilitative programs, or religious services; restricted
bathing and shaving times; no visitation rights; and no ability to spend
more than an hour a day outside the cell. 337 In Wojtczak v. Cuyler,338
the district court held that the denial of opportunities available to other
prisoners as a condition of the protection he was entitled to under the
Eighth Amendment violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 339
A sex offender was denied parole because he hadn't participated in sex
offender treatment.340 But the reason he didn't participate was that the
program required him to admit his guilt.341 In In re Personal Restraint
of Dyer3 2-a case reminiscent of McKune v. Lile343-the Washington
Supreme Court refused to reach this argument,344 but the dissent argued
that conditioning his parole on his willingness to incriminate himself
violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 345
3. What Deals Might Prisoners Like?
More generally, consider some right that isn't very valuable to the inmate
and that the prison would like the inmate to waive. In Lile, the prison wanted its
sex offender inmates to participate in a treatment program, and it's plausible
that admitting responsibility improves the benefit an inmate receives from the
program. Moreover, most sex offenders probably don't mind the condition: it
usually doesn't hurt them to admit crimes for which they've already been
convicted, and no one will know if they omit undiscovered sex crimes. Even if
they do mind the condition, they probably prefer the proposed benefit more.
Such cases are good opportunities for the voluntary waiver of a
constitutional right in exchange for some benefit. To get a sense of what other
rights prisoners might be willing to trade away, it's useful to first have a sense
of what other rights prisoners have.
It almost goes without saying that prisoners' rights are severely restricted,
so prisoners have fewer rights to trade away than free people. (On the other
hand, their benefits are also severely restricted, so they may be more willing to
trade away rights for benefits than free people.) Some rights, like the right to be
336Id. at 1294.
337 Id. at 1290-91.
338 480 F. Supp. 1288.
339 Wojtczak, 480 F. Supp. at 1303-06.
340In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 189 P.3d 759, 763-64 (Wash. 2008).
3 4 1 1d.
342 189 P.3d 759.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 321-24.
344Dyer, 189 P.3d at 769 n.7.
345Id. at 776-77 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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free from unreasonable searches, don't apply at all in prisons.346 And almost all
other rights are severely limited in prisons; a "regulation imping[ing] on
inmates' constitutional rights... is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." 347 But these rights do still exist. For instance:
* Procedures for revoking good-time credits must comply with certain
minimal due process requirements. 348
" Racial discrimination in prisons is reviewed under strict scrutiny.349
Racial discrimination in prison job assignment can violate equal
protection, 350 and residential segregation in prisons seems legally
doubtful.351
* Inmates have free speech rights, 352 and appellate courts have
invalidated prison regulations prohibiting prisoners from receiving
standard-rate mail3 53 or material printed from the Internet.354
* Prisons can't deny inmates of minority religions "a reasonable
opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity
afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious
precepts. '355
* The prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment356 implies a
prohibition on "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," 357
which includes "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners." 358 And this implies not just the usual sorts of negative rights
that apply to free people, but also affirmative obligations on the
government to provide, within limits, food, shelter, clothing, medical
care (including mental health care), and protection from other inmates.
346 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984).
347 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987). Equal protection isn't subject to Turner balancing. See Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499, 510 (2005); cf text accompanying supra note 269 (explaining that the
Establishment Clause isn't subject to Turner balancing).348 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
349 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
350 See Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004); Black v. Lane, 824 F.2d
561, 562 (7th Cir. 1987).
351 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507; Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968).
352 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
353 See Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001).
354 See Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 364 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).355 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 332 (1972) (per curiam); see also Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam).
356 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger,
No. CIV-5-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009)
(ordering release of California prisoners due to unconstitutional overcrowding).357 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).3581Id
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* Prisoners have some substantive due process rights, like the right to
marry.359
* Prisoners have some access-to-court rights enforceable against prisons,
possibly resting on the Petition Clause.360
For instance, what if-given the prevalence of racial gang violence361-a
prison wanted to suggest, and some prisoners would prefer, a system of
"separate but equal" racial segregation?
What if, to save mailroom costs or perhaps to maintain security, 362 a prison
wanted to suggest, and some prisoners would not mind, a (perhaps partial) ban
on incoming mail?363
What if a prison wanted to suggest, and some prisoners would welcome, a
system of summary punishment that would do away with due process but might
reduce inmate-on-inmate violence? Or what if doing away with some elements
of due process would simply save money, and the prison proposed investing
those savings in other benefits that some prisoners would value more, such as
improved medical care, more vocational training programs, or better gym
equipment?364
These are questions that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should
answer.
35 9 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
36 0 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); id. at 839-40 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483,485-86 (1969).
361 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 532-34 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
362 See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-93 (ban on correspondence related to security
concerns); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-52 (1979) (security-related "publisher-only"
rule for books and magazines); Prison Extremism and the First Amendment, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.adl.org/civil-rights/prison-ex.asp (last visited Sept. 10,
2011) ("Regulations that exclude publications from a prison because of security concerns
have been found constitutional when the regulations have required individualized review of
any material before it is banned .... ).
363 See Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 364 F.3d 1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).
364 The Prison Litigation Reform Act has limited the scope of prison consent decrees;
now "[p]arties to prison reform consent decrees can no longer provide remedies above the
constitutional minimum." Shima Baradaran-Robison, Comment, Kaleidoscopic Consent
Decrees: School Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison
Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. REv. 1333, 1359. Thus, in a
lawsuit alleging due process violations, a prison can't settle the lawsuit in exchange for extra
(not constitutionally required) security measures. But despite the PLRA limitations, these
questions are still interesting because a voucher prison could suggest such "deals" on its
own, not prompted by any litigation.
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4. Do the Modern Cases Make Sense?
Whether or not the particular prison cases cited above are right, it makes
sense that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply in some way in
prisons. Kathleen Sullivan argues that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is, in large part, about preserving "the overall distribution of power between
government and rightholders generally, and among classes of rightholders," 365
and I'll adopt her analysis here for illustrative purposes. Conditions attached to
government benefits can affect this distribution in three ways:
* The relationship between government and rightholders. "Preferred
constitutional liberties generally declare desirable some realm of
autonomy that should remain free from government encroachment.
Government freedom to redistribute power over presumptively
autonomous decisions from the citizenry to itself through the leverage
of permissible spending or regulation would jeopardize that realm." 366
* Horizontal relationships among classes of rightholders. Conditions
"necessarily discriminate[] facially between those who do and those
who do not comply with the condition. If government has an obligation
of evenhandedness or neutrality with regard to a right, this sort of
redistribution is inappropriate." 367
* Vertical relationships among rightholders. "[T]o the extent that a
condition discriminates de facto between those who do and do not
depend on a government benefit, it can create an undesirable caste
hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights." 368
Sullivan sees the second argument as primarily affecting constitutional
rights that "entail . . . obligations of evenhandedness," 369 like the free speech
and religion clauses.370 Thus, any condition attached to a prison benefit that
would promote one viewpoint over another should probably be unconstitutional
both before and after vouchers.
Religion is a special case, though. Conditions promoting one religion over
another, or promoting religion over irreligion, are rightly considered
unconstitutional now. But as discussed above, vouchers would fundamentally
alter this result by providing the "genuine and independent private choice"
demanded by Establishment Clause doctrine. Perhaps, in a world of vouchers, it
would make sense for a Christian prison not only to offer a Christian immersion
experience (which is an Establishment Clause issue) but also to require, as a
corollary, the waiver of any inconsistent religious freedom rights that an inmate
365 Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1490.
366Id. The heading of this bullet point is from id. at 1491.
367 Id. at 1490. The heading of this bullet point is from id. at 1491.
368Id. at 1490. The heading of this bullet point is from id. at 1491.
369I. at 1496.
370Id. at 1496-97.
2011] 1035
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
might have under the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA, 371 like the right to have
a Buddhist chaplain.
The third anti-caste argument, in Sullivan's view, applies to "[t]he
fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine," 372 and it would
certainly apply as well to the suspect classifications branch, which is most
directly concerned with caste. Thus, prisoners, both before and after vouchers,
would be unable to trade away their right to equal treatment based on race.
(Thus, voucher prisons advertising themselves as "separate but equal" with
respect to race would likely be unconstitutional, though one can still envision
prisoners segregating themselves voluntarily, with different prisons attracting
prisoners of different races.373)
But the first argument-that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
prevents the government from using "the strategic manipulation of gratuitous
benefits to aggrandize public power" 374-is potentially the most interesting for
our purposes. "On this view, government overreaches when it offers benefits in
order to gain leverage over constitutional rights. The state may have many good
reasons to deal out regulatory exemptions and subsidies, but gaining strategic
power over constitutional rights is not one of them. '375 Richard Epstein makes a
similar argument, though one that sounds in efficiency: "By barring some
waivers of constitutional rights, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
allows disorganized citizens to escape from what would otherwise be a socially
destructive prisoner's dilemma game." 376
The danger of government acquiring power over benefit recipients differs
according to context. Epstein fears that if government can constitutionally
freeze all development and then offer landowners "parcel-by-parcel exemptions
in exchange for easements across beachside backyards without further
compensation," it will have circumvented the just compensation requirement of
the Takings Clause. 377 Charles Reich fears that government, with its massive
resources, can reduce the scope of individual rights not by impermissible
regulation but simply by granting benefits to those who agree not to exercise
certain disfavored rights.378
In prisons, this danger seems fairly acute. Prisoners are guaranteed a
constitutional minimum of rights, but in many areas, this minimum is extremely
low. Most actual prison conditions, however bad, are substantially above the
371 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-I (2006).
372 Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1498.
373 This is of course constitutional under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and
its progeny.
374 Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1493.
3 7 5 Id.
376 Epstein, supra note 312, at 22.
377 See Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1494; see also Epstein, supra note 312, at 62.
378 See Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1494; see also Charles Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 764 (1964).
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constitutional minimum, and this gives the government a huge amount of
leverage.
Consider, for instance, the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment, which, the Supreme Court reminds us, "does not outlaw
cruel and unusual 'conditions."' 379 Prisons are not responsible for substandard
medical care, inmate-on-inmate violence, or any other condition of
imprisonment, unless prison officials (whether doctors or guards) show
"deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm. 380 When such
indifference is lacking, it is a given that prisons can be uncomfortable,
unpleasant, brutal places. 381
Moreover, much of prisoners' treatment isn't even subject to the fairly
minimal standards of the Due Process Clause. "[P]rison officials have broad
administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage,"
and "lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected
liberty interests." 382 "As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to
which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in
itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight."383
Thus, in Hewitt v. Helms,384 an inmate was transferred from the general
prison population to administrative segregation, where he had "no access to
vocational, educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs," nearly
continuous confinement in his cell, and virtually no showers some months.385
The Supreme Court held that "the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and
more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence" and that
"administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should
reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." 386 Because
the transfer to administrative segregation did not implicate any liberty interest
covered by the Due Process Clause, prison officials would have been free to
transfer Helms without process of any kind-indeed, on a whim-if the state
didn't happen to have regulations with mandatory language restricting such
transfers to specified circumstances. 387
379 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
38 0 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104-06 (1976).
381 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Chapman, 452 U.S. at 349;
McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991).
382 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983).
3 83 Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
384459 U.S. 460 (1983).
3 85 Id. at 479 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386Id. at 468 (majority opinion).
387I. at 471-72.
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The same goes for denials of parole 388 and transfers to other prisons,38 9 as
well as denials of good-time credit,390 "despite the undoubted impact of such
credits on the freedom of inmates." 391
In such a context, the possibilities for government overreaching through
attaching conditions to benefits seem nearly unlimited. The Epstein fear-that
government would overregulate and yield back development rights-would
require an initial round of overregulation, which is of course possible but does
require spending some political capital. The Reich fear-that government
would buy up people's liberty by offering valuable "New Property" benefits-
would require an initial round of taxation to finance these strategic benefits; this
would be visible, on-budget, and an expensive mechanism of social control.392
None of this applies in prisons. Prison officials already have all the legal
authority they need to make an inmate's prison experience substantially less
pleasant with absolutely no judicial oversight by underinvesting in prison
security and health care-so that there need not be "deliberate indifference"-
and by removing anything that isn't part of inmates' liberty interest.
Consider McKune v. Lile,393 which I have discussed above, 394 where
inmates had to waive their Fifth Amendment rights to participate in a sexual
abuse treatment program. Those who didn't participate not only lost the benefits
of the program, but also lost visitation rights and work opportunities and had to
live in a less safe unit of the prison. 395 The "benefit" being offered wasn't just
the carrot of participation in the program, but also the stick of losing valuable
existing prison benefits. Of course, in the prison context, it's entirely valid to
consider all that part of the "benefit," since neither visitation, nor prison
employment, nor residence location is part of the baseline of prisoners' rights.
Faced with such a choice, few inmates would hold on to their constitutional
rights. They would accept the benefit, even when it's inferior to their status quo
ante, simply because it is superior to their threatened status quo post.
The constitutional and political processes that prevent the government from
"offering" not to remove existing portions of would-be beneficiaries'
endowments ("agree to warrantless searches of your public housing, or else
you'll lose not only the housing but also your job," or "agree to build a bike
path, or else you'll lose not only your development permit but also your car")
are largely absent. Prison officials' self-interest may sometimes do the job:
television and gym equipment are offered not because they're required or
because there is a political constituency in their favor, but because they reduce
388 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979).
389 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976).390 Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
39 1 Helms, 459 U.S. at 467-68.
392 See Sullivan, supra note 312, at 1495; see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.
1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
393 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
3 9 4 See supra text accompanying notes 321-24.
395 Lile, 536 U.S. at 30-31.
1038 [Vol. 72:5
CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
in-prison violence.396 But if their threats are sufficiently draconian, inmates will
systematically waive their rights rather than forgo their benefits, so prison
officials will rarely have to actually make good on the threat and cut off
television and gym privileges.
The threat that, in the absence of an unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
government would offer benefits strategically in order to induce the waiver of
rights-especially those rights that actually make life more difficult for prison
administrators-is thus very real.
C. The Doctrine in a World of Vouchers
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine should probably apply differently
in a world of prison vouchers. Prisons should have more leeway than they do
now to offer prisoners "deals" in which the prisoners waive constitutional rights
in exchange for some benefit.
In the previous subsection, I have argued that the risks of government
offering benefits strategically to induce a waiver of rights are substantial in the
prison context. But all this is very fact-specific. How willing we should be to
impose a strong unconstitutional conditions doctrine depends on how acute the
risk seems in the context at hand.
And in a world of prison vouchers, where prisons are competing-and,
moreover, are competing to make themselves more attractive to prisoners-
these risks of abuse are seriously attenuated. Indeed, perhaps the problem is the
opposite-perhaps, with prison vouchers, we should worry that prisons will
become too good from prisoners' perspectives, diluting the deterrent value of
prison. Perhaps, in a world of prison vouchers, the government should actively
intervene in the prison market to prevent prison conditions from becoming too
good, or from catering to prisoners' less desirable preferences (like self-
segregating on the basis of gang affiliation).397 However that may be, there
seems to be much less reason to fear that prisons will take advantage of inmates
by unreasonably inducing them to waive constitutional rights.
If competition is sufficient, we should be less worried about the risks that
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine addresses. 398 Moreover, as discussed
earlier,399 the government should have a continuing responsibility to assure
"constitutionally compliant spots": any inmate should be able to choose a space
in a prison, provided either directly by the government or indirectly by contract
with a private provider, where all of the usual constitutional requirements apply,
396See, e.g., PETER M. CARLSON & JUDITH SIMON GARRETT, PRISON AND JAIL
ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY 93 (2d ed. 2008).397 See Volokh, supra note 22 (manuscript at 38-39).
398Cf Epstein, supra note 312, at 68 (suggesting that.the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has little role to play in government employment because the competitive nature of
employment markets minimizes the chance that government is acting strategically against
employees' interests).399 See supra text accompanying notes 223, 288.
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including a strong unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Otherwise, an inmate-
who, of course, is required to go to some prison---could be faced with a choice
of prisons that all require the waiver of some constitutional right. If every
inmate is guaranteed a "constitutionally compliant" spot, we may be more
confident that, when a voucher prison offers a benefit with strings attached, it's
not improperly inducing the waiver of rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout this Article, I have been taking a doctrine developed in the
context of education and applying it to prisons. It is worth thinking whether the
resulting doctrine of prison vouchers can now tell us anything interesting about
education.
I've noted, on a few occasions, that under a system of prison vouchers, the
government should have a continuing duty to guarantee a constitutionally
compliant spot for anyone who wants one. "Constitutional compliance" means
just secularity for the purposes of the Establishment Clause analysis,400 but for
the purposes of the unconstitutional conditions analysis it means observing all
the usual constitutional rights and not offering any "deals" that would be
considered impermissible under current doctrine.40 1
So far, this issue rarely, if ever, comes up in the education context. Students
almost always have the option of attending a public school, which, because it is
directly run by the government, is subject to all the usual constitutional
restrictions. But imagine a voucherized world where the government has
abandoned the provision of education but hasn't abandoned compulsory
education. (Or it need not even be a voucherized world. Suppose the
government chooses not to run its own public school but just assigns students to
a local private school-a situation confronted by the First Circuit in Logiodice
v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute.402)
It seems that, in such a world, there should be a similar requirement for the
government to provide the full complement of constitutional rights to any
student who wants them, either by running a public school of last resort, or by
contracting with a private school to provide the rights. This requirement should
exist as long as education is compulsory-and the government could relieve
itself of this duty simply by making education non-compulsory (not an option
for prisons, of course).
This seems like it should be the rule, but I doubt that current doctrine can
get us there. Private schools aren't state actors on a "public function" theory,
nor does the government's requirement that children attend some school convert
every school into a state actor. The First Circuit declined, in Logiodice, to find
4 00 See supra text accompanying notes 223, 288.
401 See supra text accompanying note 399.
402296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002). In Logiodice, the Maine communities of Pittsfield,
Burnham, and Detroit chose not to operate a local high school and instead contracted with
the private Maine Central Institute. Id. at 24.
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state action in the disciplining of a student by the only available free school,
though it understood the "impulse to expand the state action doctrine" to reach
the "threat of wrongful expulsion from the local school of last resort (at least for
those who cannot pay). '403 But the analysis here suggests a possible change to
state action doctrine as it relates to education: with respect to their status as
custodians of schoolchildren subject to compulsory education, schools should
be considered state actors, though, like prisons, they should have enhanced
ability to negotiate the waiver of students' rights in exchange for other benefits
as long as a fully constitutionally compliant alternative is available.
The intuitive reason is the same as it is for prisons-prisons and schools
may be different in all sorts of ways, but as long as education is compulsory,
they are similar in that people are forced to be there. 4°4 Private providers should
have broad leeway to negotiate alternative, non-constitutional deals as long as
the unwilling "consumers" (i.e., students or inmates) have a constitutionally
compliant option at their disposal. The government can provide this option
either by running its own public schools or by contracting with private schools
to provide a constitutionally compliant education for those who want one.
Even now, the educational system contains both "compulsory" and
"voluntary" students, depending on whether they're above the statutory
compulsory education age. A private school in a fully voucherized world
without public schools might then have some students with whom it must
observe constitutional norms (based on a constitutional-school-of-last-resort
contract with the government), and others, students with whom it needn't.
But let's return to prisons. In this Article, I have explored how a system of
prison vouchers would affect constitutional analysis.
The main result has been that faith-based prisons would be fully
constitutional. Faith-based prisons, under a voucher system, wouldn't have to
tone down their religious material (and, on the contrary, could tone it up
substantially); they wouldn't have to divest themselves from disciplinary
403 d. at 29. "[C]reating new exceptions is usually the business of the Supreme
Court... ." Id.
404The Supreme Court has occasionally noted the connection between children's
constitutional rights and the existence of compulsory education laws, though, at public
schools, this connection has not been very important, since the mere fact that public schools
are staffed by government employees is sufficient for state action. See New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); cf. Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948) ("The operation of the state's
compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious
instruction .... Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in
part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes."); see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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matters; and no individual prison would have to have a variety of programs,
secular or otherwise.
The secondary result has been that prisons under a voucher scheme would
have greater leeway to propose waivers of constitutional rights in exchange for
other benefits. This applies in the religious context (a religious prison could
demand the waiver of various free exercise rights) and in contexts entirely
separate from religion (a prison could offer cutting back on its grievance system
in exchange for better medical care).
A system- of prison vouchers has many potential advantages and
disadvantages. On'the plus side, it would finally give prisons an incentive to
compete on dimensions that are valuable to prisoners and prison reformers
alike, such as decent medical care or low rates of assault or rape. On the
negative side, it would also give prisons an incentive to compete on socially
negative dimensions, such as looking the other way as prisoners smuggled in
contraband; it would facilitate the self-segregation of prisoners by gang
affiliation; and, more generally, to the extent that prisons became less
unpleasant places from inmates' points of view, the deterrent value of prison
would be lessened.
The positives and negatives are both substantial, and I remain agnostic
about whether prison vouchers are a sensible reform proposal. But whichever
way one comes out, the constitutional ramifications, in particular the effect on
the constitutionality of faith-based prisons, should be part of the analysis. As for
the rest of the analysis, it is a subject I leave to other work. 40 5
40 5 See generally Volokh, supra note 22.
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